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International Law Constraints as Executive Power
Rebecca Ingber*
The use of international law to understand domestic authority has a long pedigree. It is also the subject
of heated debate, which focuses predominantly on the extent to which international law can or should serve
as a limit on political actors, in particular the President, and the extent to which it can be invoked to
expand our understanding of domestic individual rights. Yet there is another significant dynamic at work
in this interplay between international and domestic law. This is the invocation of international law not
as a constraining force on government actors, but as an enabling force within the domestic system. This
Article explores the Executive’s invocation of international law to support expansive interpretations of
statutory or constitutional grants of authority; to narrow domestic prohibitions on executive action and
narrow protections for individuals; and to justify the displacement of the ordinary operation of domestic
legal rules, at times exchanging the domestic legal architecture for a more permissive framework based in
international law.
Despite these dramatic effects, this “empowerment phenomenon” often goes unnoticed. In and of itself, the
existence of international law empowerment is not inherently problematic. The dangers lie in the lack of
attention and understanding paid to how it operates. In its most aggressive form, the empowerment phe-
nomenon can result in an executive branch released from traditional statutory and constitutional con-
straints, free to act up to the limits of international law norms that the Executive itself asserts the
authority to interpret. The hazards in this phenomenon lie in multiple factors: the insufficiency of interna-
tional law itself as a sole check in the domestic legal realm; the discretion the Executive exercises over
international law through its interpretive power; and the frequent lack of expertise and engagement with
international law by those charged with checking executive authority. This Article examines the mecha-
nisms through which the empowerment phenomenon operates, and navigates the tension between granting
the Executive sufficient flexibility on the international plane and reining in that authority when it
threatens to undermine fundamental domestic constraints.
Introduction
In the winter of 2010, two high-level lawyers working in the U.S. De-
partment of Justice faced a forbidding task.1 The question before them:
could the President lawfully target to kill an American citizen living in
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1. The following facts are taken from a number of open sources, press reports, and declassified U.S.
documents. See, e.g., Memorandum from the Off. of Legal Counsel to the Att’y Gen. (Jul. 16, 2010),
Applicability of Federal Criminal Laws and the Constitution to Contemplated Lethal Operations Against Shaykh
Anwar al-Aulaqi [hereinafter July 2010 OLC Memorandum]; Mark Mazzetti et al., How a U.S. Citizen
Came to Be in America’s Cross Hairs, N.Y. Times (Mar. 9, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/10/
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Yemen who, according to their colleagues in the intelligence community,
posed a very real and significant threat to the United States, and who had
already launched one failed attack on U.S. soil?2 Capture, they were told,
was impossible, and thus bringing him to trial was not a viable option. This
was not a question of crafting a persuasive brief. There would be no judge to
act as final decision maker. The legal decision—and that heavy responsibil-
ity—was the Executive’s alone.
A year earlier, these lawyers had arrived to head a small but powerful
legal office within the Justice Department—the Office of Legal Counsel—
that was still reeling from the taint of the torture memo years. They came in
to serve under an administration that had campaigned on a platform of ad-
herence to the rule of law—both international and domestic—in the ongo-
ing prosecution of the conflict with Al Qaeda and the wider fight against
terrorism. Moreover, they were legal scholars with an established view of the
Presidency as bound by law and beholden to Congress, even in war.3 There
could have been no question of drafting an opinion on targeting Americans
that took a dismissive approach toward constitutional and statutory protec-
tions, or of simply finding these rights inapplicable in wartime.4 Nor would
they have been inclined to reject international law constraints on the Presi-
dent’s wartime activities. Even the prior administration had long since given
up its more extreme arguments on executive power in favor of assertions of
compliance with international law and domestic statutes.5
This commitment to a Presidency bound by both domestic and interna-
tional law compelled a painstaking assessment of each of the potential legal
hurdles to the proposed course of action—and there were many. A congres-
sional statute prohibits the killing of U.S. citizens abroad. An executive
order bans assassination. Several clauses of the Constitution, the due process
clause among them, safeguard life and liberty, and typically mandate long-
established processes before the government may take them away. There
were also potential obstacles in international law: disputes over the geo-
world/middleeast/anwar-al-awlaki-a-us-citizen-in-americas-cross-hairs.html. A more granular discussion
of the legal arguments in the OLC memoranda follows in Part I.C.2.
2. See, e.g., Scott Shane, Objective Troy (2015) (discussing al-Awlaki’s role in the failed, but
nearly successful, attempt to blow up an airliner over Detroit in 2009).
3. See, e.g., David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb – Framing
the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 689 (2008).
4. Contra John Yoo, The Real Problem with the Obama Administration’s Drone Memo, Nat’l Review (Jun.
26, 2014), http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/381351/real-problem-obama-administrations-drone-
memo-john-yoo (arguing that due process does not apply to targeted killing in wartime); Noah Feldman,
Obama’s Drone Attack on Your Due Process, Bloomberg View (Feb. 8, 2013), http://
www.bloombergview.com/articles/2013-02-08/obama-s-drone-attack-on-your-due-process (arguing that
“[t]he white paper should have said that due process doesn’t apply on the battlefield”).
5. See, e.g., John B. Bellinger, Address at the London School of Economics: Legal Issues in the War on
Terrorism (Oct. 31, 2006), http://www.state.gov/s/l/2006/98861.htm (articulating the U.S. position on
how its wartime actions comport with international law); Brief for the Respondents at 19–22, Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (No. 03-6696) (arguing that the President’s powers are not contrary to,
but rather bolstered by, domestic statutes).
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graphic reach of the conflict; human rights prohibitions on extrajudicial
killings; and law of war regulations regarding whom a state may lawfully
target within an armed conflict.
Their deliberations were secret at the time, but we now know that these
lawyers concluded that the government had the authority to target and kill
Anwar al-Awlaki, and that they crafted two opinions outlining their legal
justification.6 Al-Awlaki was killed in a U.S. drone strike the following year.
Ultimately, under court order, the White House released redacted versions
of the opinions. These memoranda assert the continued application of do-
mestic laws to al-Awlaki and assess them in turn. They insist as well upon
adherence to international law. More than that, in order for such a killing to
pass muster under each of the relevant domestic law rules, the memoranda
assert, it must accord with international law.
Intertwined with their insistence on adherence to both domestic and in-
ternational law, the memoranda make a subtle move, one that captures the
interconnectedness of these two realms. The memoranda find an implicit
exception to each of the domestic rules: the statutory prohibition, the execu-
tive order, and constitutional protections. But they do not find a wartime
exception per se; one presumes the authors worked hard to avoid that result.
Rather the memoranda infer a more narrowly tailored exception for killing
that accords with the international laws of war. Instead of checking two
boxes—one for compliance with domestic law, one for compliance with in-
ternational law—the memoranda in a sense rely upon one to fulfill the
other. Compliance with domestic law turns on compliance with interna-
tional law.7
Reliance on international law constraints to serve as the limiting principle
to a significant assertion of executive power provides a modicum of comfort
here. That comfort level might depend on the extent to which the interna-
tional law constraints on the state’s actions in this sphere are well-under-
stood, legitimately constraining, and based in longstanding, publicly-
scrutinized and sufficiently-debated understandings and practice. Such reli-
ance on international law as the critical limit on presidential prerogative
6. According to press reports, while the legal decision—and the task of crafting the memoranda—
rested with the Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”), there was nevertheless much interagency discussion of
the plan to target al-Awlaki, and it reportedly met no vocal dissent within the executive branch lawyers
group working on these issues. See, e.g., Shane, supra note 2, at 224.
7. In a sense, this turn to international law is similar to the move presidents have made historically in
wartime and other areas of outward-looking affairs: look to international laws to govern in lieu of the
domestic. When viewed through that historical lens, one might argue that the novel move here may be
not the turn to international law, but rather the insistence that domestic law continues to operate. Yet
that characterization turns largely on the extent to which a given act is a traditional exercise of wartime
or foreign affairs authority, and clearly regulated by traditional international law rules, or is more appro-
priately a domestic affair. The example at hand does not fall neatly into either category; rather, it involves
the targeted killing of an American citizen abroad, for alleged operational participation in a terrorist
organization.  The Executive asserts both that such an act would fall squarely within an armed conflict
authorized by a congressional use of force statute, and that the conflict is not regulated directly by
traditional international law-of-war rules but rather by analogies to only some of these rules.
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might have provided more assurance in a world in which those charged with
checking executive action were as comfortable citing Vattel and debating
the finer points of neutrality law as they were the President’s Article II
powers.8 Today, however, the Executive’s asserted compliance with interna-
tional law indicates constraint, but there is insufficient engagement by
many domestic actors with the content of international law in this area to
ensure that this is so.
The domestic legal question at issue here thus turns not only on interna-
tional law, but almost entirely on the Executive’s interpretation of interna-
tional law. And every aspect of the Executive’s position—from the existence
of a transnational armed conflict with a nonstate actor, to the geography of
the conflict and the groups that are party to it, to who within those groups
are lawful targets, and what constellation of facts suffices to make that deci-
sion—has been highly contested. The Executive’s interpretations have been
challenged not just by other states and scholars but even by the very legal
experts working on these matters within the executive branch.9 Further-
more, many of the Executive’s legal positions in this realm are internal,
secret, and evolving. While a well-informed reader might piece together
certain components of these positions from bits of speeches, memos, and
legal briefs, 10 much of the Executive’s position is closely-held and profess-
edly fact-driven, 11 known and moreover understood only by the small cadre of
lawyers working and debating these issues inside the executive branch.12
8. See, e.g., 1 Paul Leicester Ford, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 226–27 (1892) (provid-
ing Thomas Jefferson’s notes on the cabinet meeting of April 19, 1793, on whether to issue a proclama-
tion of neutrality, and whether to receive the French Minister).
9. See, e.g., John O. Brennan, Remarks at the Program on Law and Security at Harvard Law School:
Strengthening Our Security by Adhering to Our Laws and Values (Sept. 16, 2011) (discussing disagree-
ment with allies over U.S. legal positions); Daniel Bethlehem, Note and Comment: Principles Relevant to the
Scope of a State’s Right of Self-Defense Against an Imminent or Actual Armed Attack by Nonstate Actors, 106 Am.
J. Int’l L. 769 (2012) (noting the lack of consensus on the meaning of “ ‘imminence’ in the context of
contemporary threats” or “on who may properly be targetable within the nonstate-actor continuum of
those planning, threatening, perpetrating, and providing material support essential to an armed attack”);
Charlie Savage, Obama Team Is Divided on Anti-terror Tactics, N.Y. Times (Mar. 28, 2010), http://
www.nytimes.com/2010/03/29/us/politics/29force.html. See generally Daniel Klaidman, Kill or Cap-
ture: The War on Terror and the Soul of the Obama Presidency (2012); Charlie Savage,
Power Wars: Inside Obama’s Post-9/11 Presidency (2015).
10. See July 2010 OLC Memorandum, supra note 1; see also Kenneth Anderson & Benjamin Wit- R
tes, Speaking the Law (2015) (cataloguing the Obama Administration’s national security speeches);
Memorandum from Respondents, Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority Relative to the De-
tainees Held at Guantánamo Bay, In re Guantánamo Bay Detainee Litigation, 577 F. Supp. 2d 312
(D.D.C. 2009) (No. 08-442) [hereinafter March 13 Brief].
11. The “functional” test that the U.S. Government employs to determine who is “part of” an enemy
force naturally requires a fact-based analysis to determine what particular set of facts are sufficient to
reach that conclusion. See, e.g., March 13 Brief, supra note 10. The OLC memoranda understandably go to
great lengths to restrict their analysis to the facts at hand. See generally July 2010 OLC Memorandum,
supra note 1. R
12. See, e.g., Alexandra Perina, Black Holes and Open Secrets: The Impact of Covert Action on International
Law, 53 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 507 (2015). See generally Savage, Power Wars, supra note 9 (detail-
ing internal debates within the Obama Administration over the President’s legal and policy positions in
the conflict with Al Qaeda).
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The Executive’s position on each of these interpretations of international
law may be right or wrong, and one day these positions may become firmly
established norms,13 but today that is far from settled, even within the exec-
utive branch itself. Nevertheless, according to the Executive’s position, this
highly controversial, partly secret, and evolving executive interpretation of
international law forms the core constraint on the Executive’s asserted au-
thority, and is thus essentially the domestic legal standard for determining
when the government may lawfully target a U.S. citizen abroad using mili-
tary force.
Reliance on international law to understand domestic norms, and to un-
derstand them in a way that both constrains and enhances executive power,
is no anomaly. It is, however, insufficiently recognized and poorly under-
stood. This example—including the apparent insufficiency of domestic law
to regulate certain areas of executive action, and the discretion the Executive
holds in interpreting the international law that binds it—captures well both
the dilemma and the dangers in interpreting the contours of both domestic
and international law in areas where the domestic and the international
intertwine.
Today, significant debate focuses on the extent to which the law purport-
ing to limit presidential action is “real” law. This is to say there is disagree-
ment over the extent to which this law provides clear outer limits and
whether these limits should or actually do cabin executive prerogative. This
skepticism arises in part from a recognition that the executive branch oper-
ates in many areas without formal, external instruments of control or over-
sight. Those concerned with executive overreach have thus looked to a wide
range of both existing and proposed norms and mechanisms to constrain
executive authority from outside and within—from heightened judicial or
congressional oversight to greater process within the executive branch it-
self—and views remain mixed on the efficacy of these checks in limiting
executive prerogative.14
An interrelated debate involves the proper place of international law in
the U.S. domestic system. This debate likewise focuses on questions of com-
13. In fact, very recent moves by the United Kingdom, France, and Australia (while this piece was in
the final stages of the editing process) suggest that other states may be converging toward the U.S.
position on using force against nonstate actors in another state’s territory. See, e.g., David Cameron,
Statement to the House of Commons, Syria: Refugees and Counter-Terrorism (Sep. 7, 2015); Ashley
Deeks, UK Air Strike in Syria (with France and Australia Not Far Behind), Lawfare (Sep. 9, 2015, 10:41
AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/uk-air-strike-syria-france-and-australia-not-far-behind.
14. See, e.g., Gillian Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship Between Internal and External Separation of
Powers, 59 Emory L.J. 423 (2009); Neal Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dan-
gerous Branch from Within, 115 Yale L.J. 2314, 2316 (2006); Bruce Ackerman, The Decline and
Fall of the American Republic (2010) (prophesying an acceleration of presidential imperialism,
aided by internal executive lawyers, leading to the tragic downfall of the American republic, and propos-
ing reforms including a “Supreme Executive Tribunal” to check executive action); Trevor W. Morrison,
Constitutional Alarmism, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 1688 (2011) (challenging Ackerman’s account of a near-
lawless Executive and defending the role of OLC as a check on the President).
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pliance and constraint, as well as suspicion over the effectiveness of interna-
tional law as “real” law.15 Does international law genuinely bind and
constrain domestic actors? Should domestic structures monitor and enforce
the state’s international law obligations? The debate focuses not only on the
direct application of international law as a rule of decision, but also on the
extent to which international law can be invoked as an interpretive tool to
understand domestic constitutional or statutory laws. Opinions differ over
the extent to which international law should be invoked to interpret domes-
tic individual rights, such as the prohibition on cruel and unusual punish-
ment,16 or to delimit grants of executive power, such as the commander-in-
chief authority, that might otherwise seem unduly broad or amorphous.17
These two strands of debate come to a head over the use of international
law to understand domestic executive authority. In seeking to cabin execu-
tive power where other mechanisms have failed, some scholars and practi-
tioners have looked to international law and institutions to provide limits.18
Others, meanwhile, have rejected international law as a check on executive
15. Scholars have noted that domestic public law shares similar characteristics with international law
in that it is often unreviewable by an external, neutral arbiter with enforcement power over the executive
branch. See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law, Constitutional Law,
Public Law, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 1791 (2009).
16. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (prohibiting the use of the death penalty
for juvenile defendants; noting a longstanding “refer[ence] to the laws of other countries and to interna-
tional authorities as instructive for its interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of ‘cruel
and unusual punishments’”; and citing as significant authorities the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights); Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down a state law that criminalized homosexual sodomy and citing juris-
prudence from the European Court of Human Rights); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002)
(prohibiting the use of the death penalty for defendants with mental disabilities and citing disapproval
“within the world community”); see also Sarah Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 Yale J. Int’l
L. 1, 4 (2006) (addressing “academic, press, and particularly congressional criticisms” of the use of
international law in expanding domestic rights); Michael D. Ramsey, International Materials and Domestic
Rights: Reflections on Atkins and Lawrence, 98 Am. J. Int’l L. 69 (2004) (critiquing the use of international
law in these cases as results-driven and unprincipled).
17. See, e.g., Ingrid B. Wuerth, International Law and Constitutional Interpretation: The Commander in
Chief Clause Reconsidered, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 61, 63–64 (2007) (arguing that the President’s commander-
in-chief authority should be interpreted in light of international law); David Golove, Military Tribunals,
International Law, and the Constitution: A Franckian-Madisonian Approach, 35 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol.
363, 364, 379–380 (2003) (asserting that “in exercising his war powers as commander in chief, the
President is constitutionally bound, at a minimum, to comply with international law” but noting the
“highly permissive character of the law of war,” and thus recognizing “that placing international law
limitations on the President’s war powers, rather than narrowly constraining them, accords the President
ample room for taking measures necessary to preserve the security of the nation.”); Jean Galbraith,
International Law and the Domestic Separation of Powers, 99 Va. L. Rev. 987, 1003–04 (2013) (arguing that
the Executive has over time aggrandized power vis-à-vis Congress, and proposing a restoration of the
international law limits that accompanied, and permitted, this aggrandizement); Stephen I. Vladeck,
Military Courts and Article III, 103 Geo. L.J. 933 (2015) (arguing that the military tribunal exception to
Article III jurisdiction should be understood as authorized and circumscribed by international law). I also
fall within this category. See Rebecca Ingber, Untangling Belligerency from Neutrality in the Conflict with Al-
Qaeda, 47 TEX . INT ’L L.J. 75 (2011).
18. See id. at sources cited therein.
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authority, branding it “amorphous” and “undemocratic.”19 Polarization in
this debate risks painting a stark picture of the role of international law in
the U.S. system, as though one is either for its use as a constraint or wholly
against it, inhibiting a more nuanced conversation over how it both does
and should operate more broadly.
In particular, this narrative obscures a more interconnected relationship
between international and domestic law in the U.S. system, and one that
does not always operate to constrain executive power.20 This Article exam-
ines the invocation of international law—even of international law limits—
not as a constraining force within the domestic legal system, but as an ena-
bling one.21 Only in understanding the interconnected ways international
law operates in the domestic system can we identify the potential dangers in
this phenomenon and undertake a nuanced assessment of its appropriateness
in any instance. In this Article, I focus in particular on the Executive’s invo-
cation of international law for the purposes of aggrandizing its own domes-
tic authority: to support expansive interpretations of statutory or
constitutional grants of authority; to narrow statutory or constitutional
prohibitions on executive action or protections for individuals; and to justify
the displacement of the ordinary operation of domestic legal rules, at times
with the effect of exchanging the ordinary domestic legal architecture for a
more permissive framework based in international law.
As a matter of practice, this “empowerment phenomenon” is not new.
Nor is the invocation of international law to understand domestic norms
inherently problematic; to the contrary it is in many respects a necessary and
19. See, e.g., Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, Against Foreign Law, 29 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 291
(2005); Jon Kyl et al., The War of Law, Foreign Aff. 115 (July–Aug. 2013); Robert J. Delahunty &
John Yoo, Executive Power v. International Law, 30 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 73 (2006) (arguing that the
President is not bound by international law, other than treaties, particularly in his exercise of war pow-
ers); Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales, Prepared Remarks at The University of Chicago Law School
(Nov. 9, 2005), http://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2005/ag_speech_0511092.html (rejecting
the use of “foreign law and international law” as “relevant in defining the terms and limits of our
Constitution”); Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 871 (2010) (rejecting international law as imposing
any limit on the President’s war powers, and calling the underlying international rules “vague” and
“amorphous”).
20. See, e.g., Golove, supra note 17 (discussing the duality of this relationship).  Jean Galbraith has
demonstrated that international law historically played a role in the domestic separation of powers, one
that over time resulted in an accretion of power to the President vis-à-vis Congress. See Galbraith, supra
note 17. Galbraith’s excellent insights provide historical context for some of the phenomena I discuss in
Part I. In a forthcoming work, she and Curtis Bradley examine the interconnected relationship between
international and U.S. domestic law in the use of force realm. Jean Galbraith & Curtis Bradley, Presiden-
tial War Powers as a Two-Level Dynamic: International Law, Domestic Law, and Practice-Based Legal Change,
N.Y.U. L. Rev. (forthcoming).
21. This Article focuses on the role of international law within the U.S. domestic system. States vary
in their approaches to incorporating international law into their domestic systems and, with respect to
the status of treaties, most fall somewhere between pure monism (under which treaties are automatically
incorporated as domestic law) and dualism (under which treaties require additional legislative implemen-
tation before becoming domestic law). The status of customary international law in these domestic sys-
tems is more complex. But many of the questions addressed in this Article—the complications that arise
when international law is used not to constrain but to expand authority under domestic law—should
resonate across systems.
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embedded feature of our legal architecture.22 Empowerment and constraint
are both logical results of this interconnection, and at times flip sides of the
same coin. Nevertheless, the empowerment phenomenon can have effects
that are both dramatic and dangerous, particularly when this phenomenon
goes unnoticed or is poorly understood. Recognizing and distinguishing the
diverse ways in which international law is invoked to enable rather than
simply to constrain domestic authority is critical to understanding executive
assertions of power and legal compliance. In its most aggressive form, this
empowerment can result in an executive branch released from traditional
domestic statutory and constitutional constraint and free to act to the limits
of what international law might permit. Moreover, when the Executive
reserves discretion to interpret the content of that international law, the
empowerment phenomenon can result in sweeping executive power to draw
the outer limits of its own domestic authority.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I sets the background for the Arti-
cle. It reconceptualizes familiar examples to shed light on the overlooked
role of international law in enhancing the Executive’s domestic authority.23
Part II explores some of the distinct dangers lurking in the empowerment
phenomenon, two of which merit particular attention. First, while interna-
tional law operates as an important check on state action, it is often an
unsuitable or insufficient replacement for domestic constraints on executive
authority, and an inappropriate allocator of intrastate power among the
branches. Second, the Executive often holds the reins—or is at least afforded
significant flexibility—in interpreting the substantive content of interna-
tional law, even when it is used to enhance its own authority. The resort to
international law as the primary check on executive action, combined with
deference to executive interpretation over the content of that international
law, can result in extraordinary executive discretion to interpret the parame-
ters of its own domestic authority, even in contexts in which strict domestic
constraints would ordinarily operate.
Moreover, the empowerment phenomenon not only facilitates the Execu-
tive’s aggrandizement of its own authority; at times it affirmatively induces
it to do so. The phenomenon influences the institutional design of internal
22. See, e.g., Cleveland, supra note 16; Galbraith, supra note 17.
23. This Article focuses on executive empowerment, but the courts and Congress also each invoke
international law at times to aggrandize their own authority. See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct.
2077 (2014) (involving, though not deciding, the extent to which Congress can enact legislation to
implement a valid treaty beyond the scope of what it might otherwise have authority to enact in the
absence of such treaty); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (holding that Congress can enact
legislation to implement a valid treaty under its necessary and proper powers). At times one branch
invokes international law in order to enhance another branch’s power. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S.
507 (2004) (invoking international law for the purposes of broadly interpreting a congressional authori-
zation to the President); Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891
(1976) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602 et seq.) [hereinafter FSIA] (codifying an interna-
tional law theory of foreign sovereign immunity and empowering courts to make determinations about
such states’ immunity from suit).
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executive branch decision making in ways that may exacerbate executive
tendencies to assert expansive interpretations of its authority and obscure the
Executive’s true legal positions. Part II demonstrates that the empowerment
phenomenon, particularly when abused or misunderstood, can have troub-
ling consequences that are in tension with ordinary separation-of-powers
principles and the rule of law.24
The identification of the empowerment phenomenon and a parsing of its
unexplored dangers form the core focus of the Article. But I will turn briefly
in Part III to considering how to grapple with the concerns I identify. One
solution might be a full return by all those charged with checking executive
authority to comprehensive engagement with international law and its in-
terplay with the domestic system. This is an ideal. A second-best, yet per-
haps more realistic, alternative is to place a greater burden on the Executive
to demonstrate legitimate reasons for invoking international law to enhance
its authority. Even when the empowerment phenomenon is appropriate, the
dangers I identify in this Article prompt a rethinking of judicial deference
to the executive and congressional acquiescence on the substantive content
of international law and its interaction with domestic power. And finally,
because the courts and Congress cannot provide total recourse, I address the
importance and sufficiency of internal institutional checks in advancing in-
ternational law compliance and in checking executive prerogative. There are
no simple answers, and all those charged with executive oversight must nav-
igate the tension between granting the Executive sufficient flexibility on the
international plane, and reining in that authority when it threatens to un-
dermine fundamental domestic constraints.
I. International Law Empowerment in the Domestic System
This Part identifies and frames the empowerment phenomenon. I first
briefly survey the conventional debates over the role of international law in
the U.S. domestic system. Next, I consider what it means to invoke interna-
tional law to enhance or aggrandize executive power.
The bulk of this Part then examines the four key mechanisms through
which the Executive invokes international law to enhance its domestic legal
authority. These include the invocation of international law: 1) to aid an
expansive interpretation of a grant of statutory or constitutional executive
power; 2) to narrow or erode a prohibition on executive power; 3) to displace
or disrupt ordinary domestic rules; and 4) to replace the domestic legal
framework with more permissive norms based in international law.
24. See, e.g., David Dyzenhaus, The Constitution of Law: Legality in a Time of Emergency
3 (2006) (warning against the existence of legal black holes, or lawless zones, as well as legal gray holes—
where “there is the façade or form of the rule of law rather than any substantive protections”).
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In addition to these four categories, I turn at the end of this Part to a
discussion of the Executive’s unsuccessful attempts at international law
empowerment.25
A. International Law in the Domestic System
International law plays a significant role in the domestic system, both as
directly enforceable federal law and as an interpretive tool, invoked to deter-
mine the original meaning of the Constitution or statutes or to help guide
our understanding of an evolving norm.26 This role has been typically un-
derstood in terms of constraint on state actors. This may occur through the
direct imposition of an international law limit as a binding rule of decision,
or through the invocation of international law as an interpretive tool, either
to construe statutory or constitutional grants of authority narrowly, or to
construe protections for individuals expansively, and as a result broaden
prohibitions on state action.27
Debate over the place of international law in the U.S. domestic system
addresses both its use as a directly enforceable rule of decision in domestic
courts and as an indirect interpretive tool. These debates are complex and
fraught, but they tend to focus predominantly on the extent to which inter-
national law either can or should constrain state actors or enhance individual
rights. Scholars and practitioners who seek to limit the role of international
law in the domestic system run the gamut and include those who reject any
invocation of international law as “undemocratic,” those who reject its use
as an interpretive tool in certain contexts, and those who would require
additional domestic implementing steps before permitting domestic courts
to rely upon international law—in particular non-self-executing treaties or
customary international law—as a rule of decision. 28
Advocates of international law, by contrast, often argue that courts and
other actors should do more to give effect to international law through stat-
utory interpretation or direct regulation of executive action. Some invoke
international law norms to support expansive interpretations of individual
25. This might seem a surprising detour, but unsuccessful attempts at empowerment provide critical
information about the Executive’s internal positions on what constitutes reasonable legal arguments.
Considering the vast quantity of legal decision making that happens without any oversight or public
knowledge, such glimpses into the black box are rare and invaluable.
26. See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. VI (treaties are the “supreme Law of the Land”); Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964) (“[I]t is, of course, true that United States courts apply
international law as a part of our own in appropriate circumstances . . . .”); see also Cleveland, supra note
16.
27. See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text.
28. See, e.g., Cleveland, International Constitution, supra note 16, at 4 (citing “academic, press, and
particularly congressional criticisms” of the use of international law in expanding domestic rights); see
also July 2010 OLC Memorandum, supra note 1; supra note 17 and accompanying text. The battle lines R
are far from strictly drawn; there are, for example, advocates of the use of international law in certain
contexts who believe it should be limited in others. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith,
Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 Harv. L. Rev.
815 (1997); Curtis A. Bradley, International Law in the U.S. Legal System (2013).
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rights in domestic litigation.29 Many international law scholars and lawyers
share a perspective that in recent years international law has come under
attack in the United States; they bemoan what they view as a lack of respect
for international law in the U.S. domestic system.30
The charged politics of this debate create a stark narrative. There is a
sense that those who champion executive power are more inclined to reject
international law, and that those who prioritize individual rights protections
must wholly support a strong role for international law. In fact, this polari-
zation presents a quite narrow view of the role of international law in the
domestic system, and has masked the more nuanced ways in which interna-
tional law is invoked that should be important to those on all sides of this
debate. This includes in particular the various ways that international law
and even international law limits are invoked, not simply as constraining
forces within the domestic legal system, but as enabling ones as well.31 Para-
doxically, it is often this very reliance on the presumed constraints of interna-
tional law (and its concomitant limiting effect on executive power) by those
charged with checking executive action that enables executive
empowerment.
B. Defining Empowerment
It is worth pausing for a moment to consider what I intend when I refer
here to “expanded” or “enhanced” executive power. The answer depends to
some degree on the nature of the particular invocation of international law
and its role in the domestic system. In some of the examples I discuss in this
Article, it may be simple to define an operation of domestic law with and
without the effect of the empowerment phenomenon. Take the following
two examples: a civil lawsuit proceeds against a defendant, or a person sus-
pected of criminal acts is charged and tried. In the empowerment context, a
principle of international law dramatically shifts the playing field: where the
Executive can invoke a claim of foreign official immunity, it consequentially
has exceptional power to move the court to dismiss the case. Where the
Executive can assert an armed conflict paradigm, which it defines by refer-
ence to international law, it may claim a law-of-war-sized exception to the
29. See, e.g., Harold Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1824 (1998);
Cleveland, supra note 16 (discussing the historical underpinnings of a spate of recent Supreme Court
decisions relying on international and foreign law for expansive interpretations of domestic rights).
30. See, e.g., Thomas H. Lee, International Law and Institutions and the American Constitution in War and
Peace, 31 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 292, 294 (2013) (“flag[ging] the dramatic growth of American skepti-
cism about international law and institutions”).
31. Scholars have examined the President’s reliance on defense of international law and institutions as
an independent source of domestic legal authority. See generally id. Some scholars have grounded the
President’s authority to effect international law compliance in the Take Care clause. See, e.g., Louis
Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution 50–51 (2d ed. 1996) (noting that
“[p]residents have asserted responsibility (and authority) to interpret . . . international obligations and to
see that they are ‘faithfully executed’, even when Congress has not enacted implementing legislation”).
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due process clause. These moves permit the Executive to do something it
might otherwise have been wholly unable to do.
In other instances, international law is invoked to understand the limits
of an otherwise amorphous grant of power, and in particular to interpret
that grant of power to extend to the limits of what international law would
permit of the state. The discussion of Hamdi in the next section illustrates
this move. If we understand executive power generally as a subset of the
whole powers of the state, then an interpretation of a particular grant of
executive power to the limits of what international law would permit of the
state would necessarily entail, at least in some cases, an expansion of execu-
tive authority at the expense of other domestic actors.
Yet in many key areas it may be impossible to contemplate precisely what
our understanding of executive power might look like absent the invocation
of international law. How, for example, should we think about the contours
of the commander-in-chief clause, or a statutory grant of war authority, in a
world in which there are no laws of war? We simply cannot know how those
grants of authority might have been crafted in such a world. Nevertheless, it
is possible to envision a spectrum of interpretation, from narrow to expan-
sive, and to consider the ways in which international law aids in supporting
a move toward the expansive end of that spectrum.
One critical respect in which international law supports this move, per-
haps counterintuitively, is by providing a limiting principle. Those charged
both with defining the contours of executive power and with checking that
power—including judges, Congress, civil society, and actors within the ex-
ecutive branch itself—typically seek some limiting principle even when pro-
posing an expansive view of executive authority. Actors who might be
inclined in a particular case toward an expansive view of executive authority
are unlikely to accept that view absent a workable limiting principle.32 Few
attempt to assert wholly uncabined presidential prerogative. In seeking a
limiting principle, lawyers within the executive branch and courts at times
point to international law as providing that limitation;33 they often do so on
the view that it provides real and appropriate limits on government action.
Yet in some areas, such as those discussed in this Article, international
law—in particular the Executive’s often-controversial interpretation of in-
ternational law—is the most permissive limiting principle that these actors
might propose with any sense of sincerity. In this way international law
legitimizes an expansive view of authority by providing the limiting princi-
ple that renders such an expansive reading acceptable.
Executive empowerment can be viewed as an expansion of the domestic
rule in these examples for another reason: it is difficult to identify another
32. See discussion infra Part I.C.1 regarding Hamdi, in which the Supreme Court blessed a fairly
broad executive detention authority over U.S. citizens but did so only on the understanding that the
wartime detention was justified under, and limited by, the laws of war.
33. See July 2010 OLC Memorandum, supra note 1. R
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\57-1\HLI105.txt unknown Seq: 13 12-APR-16 10:15
2016 / International Law Constraints as Executive Power 61
readily available limiting principle in domestic law that would support a
similarly expansive interpretation. This is not to say that it is impossible to
imagine a similarly expansive interpretation derived from a limiting princi-
ple outside of international law. But arriving at such an interpretation
would, in many instances, require formulating a new principle of domestic
law rather than relying on existing principles. Such a new formulation
would likely lack the sense of legitimacy and the pedigree that a reliance on
international law provides, and would thus face a steeper hurdle to
acceptance.
C. International Law Empowerment Mechanisms
This section identifies and examines four discrete mechanisms through
which the executive invokes international law as a means of enhancing do-
mestic power: 1) as an interpretive tool to enhance statutory or constitu-
tional grants of authority; 2) to infer exceptions to domestic constraints on
executive authority or to protections for individuals; 3) to justify the dis-
placement of the ordinary operation of domestic legal rules, and 4) to ex-
change the domestic legal architecture for a more permissive framework
based in international law. I draw on current as well as historical examples
to illustrate these different categories. Some examples include elements of
many or all of the mechanisms discussed.
1. International Law Enhancement of Grants of Authority
One critical role that international law plays in the domestic realm is as
an interpretive tool to guide our understanding of domestic law texts. Re-
gardless of the status of a particular treaty provision or rule of customary
international law as directly enforceable domestic law, it may be invoked
indirectly to divine the framers’ or drafters’ intent in order to resolve ambi-
guities or to determine the meaning of particular words or concepts, as well
as to provide context for our understanding of evolving norms.34 This inter-
pretive tool operates both to aid compliance with international law, as well
as to provide content and context to our understanding of domestic norms.
Often, international law is invoked to interpret a grant of authority nar-
rowly, yet this interpretive tool can also enable an expansive reading of exec-
utive authority.
One way enhancement occurs is as a simple and necessary corollary to the
invocation of international law to delimit the outer contours of grants of
constitutional or statutory authority. When scholars and courts look to in-
ternational law as a limiting principle to understand otherwise amorphous
grants of executive authority, such as the commander-in-chief or foreign
affairs authority,35 reliance on international law to shape these grants of au-
34. See Cleveland, supra note 16.
35. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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thority does not require a narrow reading of that authority, and can instead
have an expansive effect. The nature of the effect depends largely upon the
substantive content of the international law norms invoked, as well as on the
presumed baseline and the alternative potential interpretations of the do-
mestic grant.36
Another way enhancement occurs is through a modified adaptation of a
longstanding canon of statutory interpretation. Under the Charming Betsy
canon, domestic statutes are interpreted so as not to violate international law
whenever feasible, based on a theory of presumed congressional intent.37
This occurs when one interpretation of an ambiguous statutory norm would
result in a conflict with international law; under this canon the statute is
interpreted narrowly to avoid a conflict.38 Under a modified approach, the
Executive and courts have pushed the boundaries of the Charming Betsy ca-
non and invoked international law as an interpretive tool not only with the
intent of promoting compliance or avoiding conflict with that law, but for
the purpose of permitting executive action to the limits of what interna-
tional law might permit. This results in an incorporation of additional pow-
ers permitted under international law—and permitted of the state—into a
grant of authority to the President that is otherwise more limited, explicitly or
otherwise. I will call this Reverse Betsy,39 as it marks a significant departure
from the longstanding Charming Betsy canon.
Under Reverse Betsy, courts or the Executive construe a statutory or consti-
tutional grant of domestic executive power broadly to extend to the limits of
what international law would permit of the state. A recent example of the
Reverse Betsy is the Supreme Court’s reliance on international law to support
an expansive view of the President’s statutory authority to use military force
in the conflict with Al Qaeda (the “AUMF”),40 essentially to the limits of
36. See, e.g., Saikrishna Prakash & Michael Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 Yale
L.J. 231 (2001) (explaining why constitutional authority should be read in light of contemporaneous
international law norms, and drawing from this broad foreign affairs authority for the executive); Gal-
braith, supra note 17, at 990 (arguing that historically Congress and the President “have relied on inter-
national law as an interpretive principle for determining the boundaries of their constitutional powers,”
in particular in a way that has aggrandized the President’s powers).
37. Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (“[A]n act of Con-
gress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction
remains.”).
38. Id.
39. Other scholars have used a similar term “reverse-Charming Betsy” to describe different phenom-
ena. See Carlos M. Vázquez, Customary International Law as U.S. Law, 86 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1495,
1588 (2011) (describing a hypothetical rule “under which ambiguous State laws will be construed when-
ever possible so as to violate international law”); Curtis Bradley, International Law in the U.S.
Legal System 55 (2013) (describing a possible “canon whereby treaties will be construed, where possi-
ble, to avoid conflicts with a statute”).
40. The 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force authorized force against the planners of the
September 11, 2001 attacks, including the organizations and states that supported them. Authorization
for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40,115 Stat. 224 (2001) [hereinafter AUMF]. This is widely
understood to refer to Al Qaeda and the Taliban. See, e.g, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519–20
(2004).
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what the international laws of war would permit of the state. To date, the
courts and the Executive have interpreted this grant of authority expansively
along two avenues: first, with respect to the specific actions authorized, and
second, with respect to the target subjects of that force.
First, the Supreme Court has interpreted the President’s statutory author-
ity to include not just “force,” per the statute’s text, but also long-term
detention of both citizens and non-citizen members of Al Qaeda and the
Taliban.41 The Hamdi Court explained its extension of the AUMF to include
detention by referencing “universal agreement and practice”42 and “long-
standing law-of-war principles,”43 invoking prior case law and treatises on
the laws of war, as well as provisions addressing combatant detention in
international treaties such as the Hague and Geneva Conventions.44 In fact,
these treaties do not themselves either authorize or define detention author-
ity; rather, they establish international law obligations regarding conditions
of confinement and the outer temporal limits of detention.45 In other words,
assuming that states will detain individuals in armed conflict, they establish
minimum standards for how states may treat detainees, and for how long
they may hold them. In the case of captured enemy fighters, for example,
detention may not last beyond the end of “active hostilities.”46 The Court
inferred from these international law prohibitions on detention beyond the
end of hostilities a rule permitting a state to detain so long as hostilities are
ongoing.47 It then invoked that implicit state authority, and incorporated it
into the congressional statutory grant of authority to the President, presum-
ably inferring that Congress must have intended to grant the President the
full authorities of the state under international law. The result was an exten-
sion of the President’s domestic statutory authority beyond the use of force
to include detention.48
41. See, e.g., Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 520; Ingrid B. Wuerth, Authorizations for the Use of Force, International
Law, and the Charming Betsy Canon, 46 B.C. L. Rev. 293, 307 (2005) (discussing the Hamdi plurality’s
reliance on international law sources to extend the force authorization to detention of enemy combatants).
42. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518 (quoting Ex parte Quirin 317 U.S. 1, 30 (1942)).
43. Id. at 521.
44. Id. at 518–521 (invoking, inter alia, Ex parte Quirin; looking to “the law of war as including that
part of the law of nations which prescribes, for the conduct of war, the status, rights and duties of enemy
nations as well as of enemy individuals”; and finding “[a]n important incident to the conduct of war”
seizure of enemies for the purpose of punishing violations of that law); Geneva Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 118, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (‘‘Prisoners
of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.’’) [hereinaf-
ter Third Geneva Convention].
45. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 520.
46. Id.
47. Some scholars argue that the Geneva Conventions directly authorize detention as a matter of
international law in traditional state-to-state armed conflict. See Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne & Dapo
Akande, Does IHL Provide a Legal Basis for Detention in Non-international Armed Conflicts?, EJIL: Talk!
(May 7, 2014), http://www.ejiltalk.org/does-ihl-provide-a-legal-basis-for-detention-in-non-international-
armed-conflicts/.
48. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 520.
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This is not simply a grant of authority in what would otherwise be a
domestic law vacuum. Quite the contrary. The Court’s expansive interpreta-
tion of the AUMF crafted statutory authority for the President’s administra-
tive detention scheme—for citizens and noncitizens alike—in the place of
the ordinary criminal framework and statutory rules to the contrary. It re-
placed the well-established procedures and constitutional and statutory
norms of the criminal law framework—for instance, Miranda, presentment,
criminal trial, sentencing—with a modified form of habeas corpus review to
adjudicate the factual basis for detention of individuals whom the executive
labeled “enemy combatants.”49 And it did so despite the express imperative
of the 1971 Non-Detention Act, which provides that “[n]o citizen shall be
imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an
Act of Congress.”50 The Court thus relied on the existence of an interna-
tional law constraint to justify a domestic statutory grant of authority to the
President, and in the process overrode the ordinary operation of explicit do-
mestic law protections.
Notably, the Hamdi Court took great pains to avoid blessing uncabined
executive prerogative. In invoking international law to interpret and en-
hance the President’s authority, the Court expressly relied in large part on
its belief that international law itself would act as a constraint on that author-
ity.51 The plurality warned of the hazards of an “unchecked system of deten-
tion,” and “unlimited power.”52 It was willing to displace existing domestic
constraints only, I argue, because it was able to import international ones,
including the express rule that detention must end “after the cessation of
active hostilities.”53 Without that limitation, the Court would have been
hard pressed to find a limiting principle elsewhere that would have permit-
ted the Executive the detention authority asserted in that case. Alterna-
tively, had the plurality simply interpreted the statute broadly without
invoking international law constraints, the Court would have effectively up-
held the indefinite detention of an American citizen, despite the 1971 Non-
Detention Act and the constitutional rights that normally attach to restric-
tion of liberty, a result in sharp conflict with the Court’s repeated concerns
over uncabined executive power.
49. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Executive must either bring
criminal proceedings against Hamdi or release him absent a congressional suspension of the writ); see also
Amanda Tyler, The Forgotten Core Meaning of the Suspension Clause, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 901 (2012) (arguing
that according to a historical account of the Suspension Clause, citizens could not be detained even
during war absent criminal charge or a suspension of the writ). But see infra note 108 (sources discussing
the Prize Cases and other historical examples in which the Court’s application of constitutional rights
turned on the individual’s enemy status or geographic location).
50. 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (Non-Detention Act); see also Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 543 (Souter, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in judgment) (arguing there is “powerful reason to think that
§ 4001(a) was meant to require clear congressional authorization before any citizen can be placed in a
cell”).
51. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 530–31.
52. Id. at 530.
53. See id. at 520 (quoting Third Geneva Convention art. 118).
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Second, the Executive has invoked international law in order to justify an
expansive interpretation of the subjects of the force authorization. Presidents
through two administrations have asserted that their statutory authority to
wage war extends beyond those expressly contemplated by the statutory
text—that is, the planners of 9/11 and those who harbored them, widely
accepted as encompassing Al Qaeda and the Taliban—to those groups’ un-
named “associated forces.”54 On this view, the President may capture, de-
tain until the end of the conflict, or kill members (and possibly even certain
supporters) of these “associated forces” for as long as the conflict lasts, and
without publicly identifying the forces in question. Since the concept of
“associated forces” is not referenced—even obliquely—in the authorization
statute itself,55 executive officials assert that such groups should be pre-
sumed to be included within the statute implicitly in accordance with “the
well-established concept of co-belligerency in the law of war.”56 The Execu-
tive has never provided much content for what it means by co-belliger-
ency.57 But its repeated assertion of the concept’s provenance in
international law is based in large part on a tacit suggestion that interna-
tional law provides both a longstanding pedigree and an outer limit to the
President’s assertion of power.58 That assertion has found purchase with
judges and members of Congress otherwise engaged in scrutinizing the Ex-
ecutive’s assertions of authority, who have relied upon it to accept an expan-
sive reading of the President’s statutory authority.59
54. The statute itself explicitly references the planners of 9/11 and those who harbored them, which
are widely understood to represent Al Qaeda and the Taliban. AUMF § 2(a). Congress ultimately ratified
the Executive’s interpretation of its authority under the AUMF for the purposes of detention (though not
force) in the 2012 Defense Authorization Act. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012,
Pub. L. No. 112-81, 125 Stat. 1298 (2011) [hereinafter 2012 NDAA].
55. The term “associated forces” was ultimately included in the 2012 NDAA, in a provision af-
firming the President’s authority to detain under the 2001 AUMF. There is still no explicit statutory
authority to use force against “associated forces,” and the executive branch continues to rely on the 2001
AUMF for these purposes. See, e.g., Authorization for Use of Military Force After Iraq and Afghanistan:
Hearing Before S. Foreign Relations Comm., 113th Cong. (2014) (statement of Stephen W. Preston, Gen.
Counsel, Dep’t of Def.) [hereinafter Preston Testimony].
56. Jeh Johnson, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def., National Security Law, Lawyers and Lawyering in the
Obama Administration, Address Before Yale Law School (Feb. 22, 2012), http://www.lawfareblog.com/
2012/02/jeh-johnson-speech-at-yale-law-school/; see also Preston Testimony, supra note 55, at 8 (“[B]ased
on the well-established concept of co-belligerency in the laws of war, the AUMF has been interpreted to
authorize the use of force against associated forces of al-Qaida and the Taliban.”).
57. See infra Part II.C.3. For a detailed critique of the Executive’s co-belligerency standard, see Re-
becca Ingber, Co-Belligerency and War Powers: The Making of Executive Law, 42 YALE J. INT ’L . L. (forthcom-
ing 2017).
58. See id.
59. In an exchange between then-Senator Levin and Senator King during a hearing of the Senate
Armed Services Committee, King expressed skepticism about the Executive’s expansive reading of the
AUMF to include associated forces. To assuage King’s concerns, Levin responded that, “Where [the
President is] authorized to use force under domestic law, [here the] AUMF, . . . th[at] authority automat-
ically extends under the law of armed conflict to a co-belligerent, to some entity that has aligned them-
selves with the specified entity against us, in the fight against us.”) See The Law of Armed Conflict, the Use
of Military Force, and the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on Armed
Serv., 113th Cong. 27-29 (2013); see also Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 75 (D.D.C. 2009)
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These invocations of international law to enhance authority under the
AUMF do not fall under conventional Charming Betsy doctrine. Though
Charming Betsy may at times be invoked to justify this move, the only com-
monality is the use of international law to interpret statutory text. Charming
Betsy, as discussed above, involves the invocation of international law to nar-
row a statute where another reading would conflict with international law.
Application of Charming Betsy to the AUMF would entail construing the
statutory grant to the President narrowly to limit the use of force to only
those actions that would not violate international law. 60 Reading the
AUMF expansively to authorize detention and to extend to groups not refer-
enced by the text has nothing to do with avoiding conflict with interna-
tional law. Putting aside for the moment whether international law might
prohibit the indefinite detention of Al Qaeda members or the extension of the
conflict beyond the specific group that attacked the United States, certainly
nothing in international law requires it. It would thus produce no conflict
with international law for Congress to prohibit the President from detaining
members of Al Qaeda, or for Congress to limit its authorization to use force
to only core Al Qaeda and not to “associated groups,” regardless of how one
interprets what international law would permit of the state itself. It is
hardly necessary to U.S. compliance for the courts to read such powers into
domestic grants of authority to the President. Instead, this example involves
interpreting a grant of authority to incorporate an extension of that author-
ity to the limits of what international law permits.61 Under this mechanism and
for these discrete purposes, the Executive itself is granted, as a matter of
domestic law, the entire authority of the state under international law.
2. International Law Exceptions to Prohibitions and Protections
In addition to its use as an interpretive tool to expand our understanding
of domestic texts, the Executive also invokes international law as a tool to
infer an exception from or a limitation on domestic constraints on executive
authority or protections for individuals. In some uses, this interpretive
mechanism can result in an implied hole in the norm or prohibition, sized to
the limits of what a particular international law norm is understood to per-
mit. In other examples it merely erodes or narrows the domestic constraint.
The result is an enhancement of executive power at the expense of these
individual protections.
(holding that “the government has the authority to detain members of ‘associated forces’ as long as those
forces would be considered co-belligerents under the law of war”).
60. See, e.g., Wuerth, supra note 41, at 299 (arguing that courts should interpret congressional force
authorizations as “not embrac[ing] violations of international law by the President”).
61. For an additional, nonwartime example see Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981),
discussed infra Part I.C.3., which also employs a Reverse Betsy move. In that case, the Executive and the
Supreme Court relied on international law principles combined with amorphous statutory authority to
enhance the Executive’s domestic authority, in order to justify the unilateral extinguishing of legal
claims against Iran. See id. at 684–85.
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The example I introduced at the outset—the Executive’s justification for
its authority to target and kill a U.S. citizen62 who is a member of Al Qaeda
or associated forces—illustrates this invocation of international law to infer
an exception to domestic constraints and protections. To date, the Executive
has asserted its understanding of the legal framework governing the conflict
with Al Qaeda in countless speeches and legal briefs.63 But the most detailed
public account of its constitutional and statutory analysis consists of two
recently released Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) memoranda analyzing the
Executive’s legal authority to target and kill Anwar al-Awlaki, a U.S. citizen
accused of plotting attacks against the United States as a leader of a force
associated with Al Qaeda.64 Under the OLC memoranda, the Executive does
not assert that domestic constitutional and statutory norms no longer pro-
tect such an individual during wartime, as some have advocated.65 Instead,
it presumes these domestic rules continue to apply in this wartime con-
62. The example of the targeted killing of a U.S. citizen is used here specifically because of the near-
consensus today on the applicability of constitutional rights and statutory prohibitions to citizens, even
while abroad, and to avoid clouding this discussion with confusion over the status of these rules to
noncitizens abroad. Related questions may also arise with respect to noncitizens—though they have yet
to receive much airing; these have arisen to some extent in the context of detention, particularly deten-
tion within the United States. In a report to Congress on a proposed transfer of detainees to the United
States, the Executive stated that “any arguably applicable constitutional provisions should be construed
consistent with the individuals’ status as detainees held pursuant to the laws of war . . . .” See Off. of
Legis. Aff., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Report Pursuant to Section 1039 for the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 (May 14, 2014) (emphasis added). But see Barron & Leder-
man, supra note 3 (citing arguments that certain constitutional protections simply should not apply in
this context). Historically, the Court’s application of constitutional protections to individuals did at
times turn on that individual’s enemy status, or location in enemy territory. See William Dodge et al.,
International Law in the U.S. Supreme Court: Continuity and Change, 142–47, 275–78, 603
(2011) (describing a line of cases “in which the Court rejected constitutional claims by enemies during
wartime” and “[e]nemy status” was defined by territorial location, citizenship, or allegiance.) That ap-
proach falls under the replacement mechanism I discuss in Part I.C.4.
63. See, e.g., Harold Koh, Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International
Law: The Obama Administration and International Law (Mar. 25, 2010), http://www.state.gov/s/l/re-
leases/remarks/139119.htm; Johnson, Address Before Yale Law School, supra note 56; Preston Testi-
mony, supra note 55. The George W. Bush Administration also employed speeches to present its legal
position on the conflict. See, e.g., Bellinger, Address at the London School of Economics, supra note 5.
64. See July 2010 OLC Memorandum, supra note 1; Memorandum from the Off. of Legal Counsel to R
the Att’y Gen. (Feb. 19, 2010), Lethal Operation Against Shaykh Anwar al-Aulaqi [hereinafter Feb. 2010
OLC Memorandum]. The memos are careful to narrow the legal justification to the particular—and
almost entirely redacted—facts at issue in that case. We can derive from what is left that they premise
their approval on the fact that the target is an operational leader of the enemy armed group as well as a
threat. The process for determining whether the factual record from the available intelligence suffices to
meet that standard is not clarified, but the memo references “high-level government officials” who have
drawn these conclusions with respect to al-Awlaki. See July 2010 OLC Memorandum, supra note 1, at 21. R
65. Cf. Yoo, The Real Problem with the Obama Administration’s Drone Memo, supra note 4; Feld-
man, Obama’s Drone Attack on Your Due Process, supra note 4.
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text,66 but it infers exceptions or carveouts to these rules for actions permit-
ted of the state under particular international law norms.67
I will start with the memoranda’s constitutional reasoning, which is less
clear than its statutory analysis, but ultimately relies upon similar excep-
tions.68 The OLC memoranda first purport to apply and satisfy the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.69 Yet “process” is not the focus of this
analysis;70 instead, the memoranda put forward a substantive standard under
which the Executive may assert an exception to due process requirements.
They base that exception upon a showing that 1) capture is infeasible; 2) the
individual is part of enemy forces;71 and 3) the individual poses a “continued
and imminent threat to U.S. persons or interests.”72 There is no clear do-
mestic or international law precedent given for the feasibility prong, nor is
there a clear means of determining how it might be met, and it is impossi-
ble to determine the extent to which it acts as a real constraint.73 The second
and third prongs are the focus of the analysis. It can be understood from the
memoranda, as well as from other legal documents, that the Executive con-
siders the requirement that an individual be “part of enemy forces” a term
of art intended to correspond to the class of individuals within a nonstate
armed group that may be targeted or detained, by analogy to the interna-
tional law-of-war classification of combatant in an enemy state armed
force.74 The third, “continued and imminent” test is of unclear provenance
66. See July 2010 OLC Memorandum, supra note 1, at 38 (asserting that the Fourth and Fifth Amend- R
ments “likely protect[ ]” U.S. citizens who may be targets in the conflict, “in some respects even while
. . . abroad”); see also Feb. 2010 OLC Memorandum, supra note 66.
67. See July 2010 OLC Memorandum, supra note 1 (analyzing whether the targeted killing would R
violate several statutory prohibitions on killing abroad, as well as the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, and
finding exceptions for the act at issue); Feb. 2010 OLC Memorandum, supra note 64; see also Department
of Justice White Paper, http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper
.pdf [hereinafter DOJ White Paper].
68. See July 2010 OLC Memorandum, supra note 1, at 38. See generally Feb. 2010 OLC Memorandum, R
supra note 64.
69. See, e.g., Feb. 2010 OLC Memorandum, supra note 64, at 6 (assuming though not deciding that,
based on al-Awlaki’s citizenship, the Due Process Clause “likely applies in some respects”).
70. The “process” the unredacted portions of the memorandum describe is this: “the highest officers
in the intelligence community have reviewed the factual basis for the lethal operation.” July 2010 OLC
Memorandum, supra note 1, at 40 (internal quotation marks omitted). Judicial review plays no role. Feb. R
2010 OLC Memorandum, supra note 64, at 6 (proposing that even the limited judicial process contem-
plated in Hamdi for enemy combatants is necessary “only when the determination is made to continue to
hold” them); see also Trevor Morrison, The White Paper and Due Process, Lawfare (Feb. 7, 2013, 7:53
PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/02/the-white-paper-and-due-process/ (arguing that the DOJ
reasoning “fails to acknowledge the broader doctrinal framework within which the Mathews test exists,”
in particular the “long established” norm “that the core of procedural due process is notice and an
opportunity to be heard before an impartial decisionmaker”).
71. See Feb. 2010 OLC Memorandum, supra note 64, at 6–7.
72. See id. at 6; July 2010 OLC Memorandum, supra note 1, at 38–40. R
73. See July 2010 OLC Memorandum, supra note 1, at 40 (citing only an Israeli legal opinion regard- R
ing the practicality of capture).
74. See id. at 21–22 nn.28–29 (citing cases and briefs dissecting who may be detained under the laws
of war and disputing assertions that under international law only individuals who are directly participat-
ing in hostilities may be targeted); March 13 Brief, supra note 10 (asserting authority to detain those
individuals who would be analogous to members of enemy armed forces in a traditional state-to-state
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but appears based at least in part on the Executive’s international law theory
of imminence, under which the Executive can respond to an imminent
threat from another state’s territory without violating the U.N. Charter’s
prohibition on the use of force.75 The memoranda thus propose an exception
to ordinary due process, defined by a substantive standard that turns
predominantly on the Executive’s international law analysis regarding the
lawfulness of the target.
The Fourth Amendment analysis proceeds in a similar fashion. The OLC
memoranda rely on domestic Fourth Amendment doctrine holding that the
use of deadly force against an individual who poses a significant and imme-
diate threat would not be “unreasonable.” 76 Yet a years-long manhunt for a
suspect in Yemen admittedly provides a very different context than the truly
instantaneous exigency undergirding the domestic precedent of the Fourth
Amendment “reasonableness” test.77 Thus in seeking to apply the domestic
“reasonableness” exception in this setting, the July 2010 OLC Memoran-
dum again invokes the above factors: the existence of an armed conflict, and
the requirement “that the targeted person is part of a dangerous enemy force
and is engaged in activities that pose a continued and imminent threat to
U.S. persons or interests.”78 Like the due process clause exceptions, each of
these factors forming the substance of the Fourth Amendment analysis turns
in large part on internal tests derived from international law.
The Executive’s position toward statutory and other domestic prohibi-
tions on targeted killings is more explicit in carving out exceptions to these
armed conflict). While the March 13 Brief explicitly reserved its scope to detention, the OLC memo-
randa’s reliance on it demonstrates that the “part of” standard clearly factors into targeting considera-
tions. Id.
75. See July 2010 OLC Memorandum, supra note 1, at 38–40; DOJ White Paper, supra note 67, at R
6–7; see also Brennan, Remarks at Harvard Law School, supra note 9. One commentator has suggested
that the “imminence” theory in the Executive’s position derives not from international law but from
internal executive policy. See Benjamin Wittes, Whence Imminence in that Drone Memo? A Puzzle and a
Theory, Lawfare (June 24, 2014), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/06/whence-imminence-in-that-
drone-memo-a-puzzle-and-a-theory/. Recent reporting further suggests the specific language “continu-
ing and imminent” may derive from a Bush memorandum on covert lethal action. See Savage, supra note
9, at 237. The reliance on an “imminence” test may in fact involve a mix of international law, domestic
law, and policy considerations, and result from a compromise between those internal actors seeking to
impose international law limits, and others seeking to satisfy internal rules. For a discussion of the harms
in such compromises, see Naz K. Modirzadeh, Folk International Law: 9/11 Lawyering and the Transforma-
tion of the Law of Armed Conflict to Human Rights Policy and Human Rights Law to War Governance, 5 Harv.
Nat’l Security J. 226 n.1, 225–304 (2014).
76. See supra note 66 at sources cited therein; see also DOJ White Paper, supra note 67, at 9 (“[I]in
circumstances where the targeted person is an operational leader of an enemy force and . . . poses an
imminent threat of violent attack against the United States . . . the use of lethal force would not violate
the Fourth Amendment.”); July 2010 OLC Memorandum, supra note 1, at 41. R
77. July 2010 OLC Memorandum, supra note 1, at 41 (citing Tennessee v. Garner, which—in contem- R
plating a scenario in which an officer must make an instantaneous decision whether to use force against a
fleeing suspect—suggests that such an officer may use deadly force to prevent the real-time escape of an
individual the officer believes poses a threat).
78. Id. at 41.
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laws’ ordinary scope that are defined by reference to international law.79 The
memoranda analyze several relevant statutes and other authorities—includ-
ing a statute criminalizing murder abroad and the executive order prohibit-
ing assassination80—and conclude that each should be read to exclude from
their scope operations by the state within an armed conflict conducted in
accordance with the international laws of war.81
In essence, the Executive’s position is that the existing executive order
prohibiting assassination, statutory prohibitions on the killing of U.S. citi-
zens, and fundamental constitutional protections all contain implicit excep-
tions for killing that is lawful under the international laws of war. The effect
of this reasoning is thus: the lawfulness under domestic law of the targeted
killing of an individual abroad turns on the Executive’s interpretation of the
lawfulness of the act as a matter of international law.82
As with the other mechanisms discussed, international law is invoked
here ostensibly as a limiting principle. The authors go to great pains not to
assert unfettered executive power. Instead, the argument is that the excep-
tions asserted by the OLC memoranda are lawful only to the extent that the
actions are lawful under international law. The limiting principle of interna-
tional law compliance softens, or purports to soften, what might otherwise
appear to be an extraordinary assertion of authority by the Executive. Yet
the result of this reasoning is an executive-inferred exception to these do-
mestic constraints, shaped by an international law standard that the Execu-
tive defines. The strength of these international law standards and the
stringency and substance of their limits on executive power thus become the
entire ballgame. Parts II and III will discuss the extent to which these inter-
national law standards may provide a sufficient limiting principle and a suf-
ficient replacement for the domestic constraints in this context.
79. Id. at 17–35; DOJ White Paper, supra note 67, at 10–15 (discussing the prohibition on killing of
U.S. nationals abroad in 18 U.S.C. § 1119(b) and the prohibition on assassination in Executive Order
No. 12333).
80. See generally DOJ White Paper, supra note 67, at 10–13; Feb. 2010 OLC Memorandum supra note
64, at 1, 4.
81. See, e.g., July 2010 OLC Memorandum, supra note 1, at 30 (reading into the foreign murder R
statute a “public authority” exception, and then asserting that “the [al-Awlaki] operation should be
understood to constitute the lawful conduct of war and thus to be encompassed by the public authority
justification,” and therefore compliant with the statute).
82. A historical example suggests that the use of international law to infer a carve-out from domestic
constraints has not been merely a wartime occurrence. In In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891), the Supreme
Court upheld the peacetime use of consular courts established by treaty to try citizens overseas without
the usual constitutional protections. Congress ultimately abolished the use of consular courts, and it is
unlikely the Ross opinion would stand today. See 70 Stat. 773, 22 U.S.C.A. § 141 (1956); see also Reid v.
Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 12 (1953) (calling Ross “a relic from a different era,” and upholding constitutional
challenges brought by American citizens tried by military courts abroad during peacetime); Cleveland,
supra note 16, at 16–17 (noting that while the intent of the Ross Court may have been to “protect[ ]
rights, because consular courts shielded Americans from barbaric foreign legal proceedings, . . . [t]he net
effect of this approach, however, was to employ international practice to deny constitutional
protections”).
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3. International Law Displacement of Domestic Rules
A third empowerment mechanism is the invocation of international law
to disrupt or displace domestic legal rules. This mechanism empowers the
Executive by disrupting the ordinary operation of domestic law in a way
that permits the Executive greater latitude to act than it might otherwise
have.
The areas of foreign sovereign immunity and the executive settlement of
claims provide examples. These are subtler than the prior wartime examples,
and enhance executive power in a less direct way. But under longstanding
doctrine in the areas of immunity and claims settlement, the Executive has
wielded considerable authority to extinguish legal claims and other property
rights by reference to international law and comity. The success of these
mechanisms is connected in part to theories of historical gloss and congres-
sional acquiescence, but international law has played a consistent role in
both the doctrines’ origins and their continued vitality.83
In cases involving sovereign or foreign official immunity, an entire law-
suit—and any claim of petitioner to redress—may be thrown out of court
altogether based on a conception of immunity drawn from longstanding
principles of international law and comity.84 The Executive’s role in immu-
nity decisions and the substantive content of the immunity doctrine have
evolved considerably. At various points in history the Executive, courts, and
Congress have all played significant roles in deciding when to extend immu-
nity and thus extinguish the claim. In early cases involving claims of foreign
government immunity, the courts relied upon customary international law
principles and comity to grant essentially absolute immunity to foreign
states, and afforded some weight to executive views.85 As views on the sub-
stantive doctrine shifted,86 so too did the Court’s level of deference, and as a
83. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring); Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 Colum L. Rev. 1, 53–56
(1993) (acknowledging “the existence of some independent but limited presidential law-making author-
ity” in the areas of claims settlement by executive agreement and foreign sovereign immunities cases).
Cf. Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 Harv. L.
Rev. 411, 452 (2012) (advocating a “circumspect” approach to finding congressional acquiescence in
executive action); Ingrid B. Wuerth, Foreign Official Immunity Determinations in U.S. Courts: The Case
Against the State Department, 51 Va. J. Int’l L. 915, 931 (2011) (grounding the Court’s immunity doc-
trine in constitutional and functional foreign relations concerns, as well as in history and congressional
authorization).
84. See, e.g., William S. Dodge, International Comity in American Law, 115 Colum L. Rev. (forthcom-
ing) (describing U.S. immunities doctrine as including “an international law ‘core’ and a comity
‘penumbra’”).
85. Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812); Curtis A. Bradley, Interna-
tional Law in the U.S. System 228–29 (2d ed. 2015) (discussing cases in which the Court issued
decisions inconsistent with the position of the State Department). See generally Wuerth, supra note 83, at
917.
86. The Executive’s substantive position evolved from a theory of absolute immunity to a restrictive
approach, which permitted an exception to immunity for commercial activity by the state. The State
Department announced this approach in a 1952 memo from the then Acting Legal Adviser Jack Tate,
which described the evolution of international law on the matter and the Department’s position of re-
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result the Court gradually moved toward a position of total deference to
executive views.87
Ultimately, this practice became burdensome for the Executive.88 In an
effort to relieve the State Department and to codify a particular theory of
immunity, Congress passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
(“FSIA”).89 Under the FSIA, the courts now make determinations of foreign
state immunity, relying on the FSIA and on its international law underpin-
nings.90 However, the executive branch continues to play a large role in
putting forth suggestions of immunity to the courts in cases involving head-
of-state and foreign official immunity,91 which the Supreme Court has held
do not fall under the FSIA.92 Thus, while U.S. practice has evolved signifi-
cantly, at various points in history in cases involving foreign nations or gov-
ernment officials—and continuing today for cases involving head-of-state
and foreign official immunity—the Executive has wielded quite significant,
strictive immunity. See Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Department of State, to Acting
Attorney General Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 Dep’t of State Bulletin 984–85
(1952). For a description of the historical evolution of U.S. practice regarding sovereign immunity, see,
e.g., Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 311 (2010). For an example of “absolute” or “classical” immu-
nity, see Schooner Exch., 11 U.S. at 116.
87. See Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588–89 (1943) (asserting that courts are bound to
accept the Executive’s position on immunity so as not “to embarrass the executive arm of the government
in conducting foreign relations”); Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 34–35 (1945) (“In the
absence of [an executive assertion of immunity], the courts may decide for themselves whether all the
requisites of immunity exist . . . in conformity to the principles accepted by the department of the
government charged with the conduct of our foreign relations.”).
88. The State Department was heavily involved in issuing immunity suggestions to the courts upon
requests of foreign states, a process that became a burden to the Department and stoked controversy over
its decisions. See Wuerth, supra note 83, at 927–28.
89. FSIA, supra note 23; Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations v. City of New York, 551
U.S. 193, 199 (2007) (citing the “two well-recognized and related purposes of the FSIA: adoption of the
restrictive view of sovereign immunity and codification of international law at the time of the FSIA’s
enactment”); Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law pt. IV. ch. 5, at 392–95 (1987). The
FSIA codified the “restrictive” theory of immunity, along with specific exceptions to immunity recog-
nized under international law, such as cases involving “rights in immovable property.” See, e.g., Permanent
Mission of India to the United Nations, 551 U.S. at 199–200 (noting that “the FSIA was also meant ‘to
codify . . . the pre-existing real property exception to sovereign immunity recognized by international
practice’”) (internal citations omitted).
90. Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations, 551 U.S. at 200.
91. Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3d 763, 773 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 897 (2014)
(granting “absolute deference to the State Department’s position on status-based immunity doctrines
such as head-of-state immunity” and “substantial weight” to “[t]he State Department’s determination
regarding conduct-based immunity”).
92. See Samantar, 560 U.S. 305; see also Curtis Bradley & Laurence Helfer, International Law and the
U.S. Common Law of Foreign Official Immunity, 2010 Sup. Ct. Rev. 213, 232 (2011) (noting that the
Samantar Court made little analysis of the international law underpinnings of the FSIA in failing to
extend it to individuals, and contrasting this approach with a 2006 British House of Lords decision that
“relied heavily on international law in construing the word ‘State’ in Britain’s State Immunity Act to
encompass foreign officials acting in an official capacity”).
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and at times absolute, authority to quash petitioners’ legal claims by refer-
ence to principles of international law and comity.93
Courts have also upheld as longstanding practice executive authority to
settle international claims disputes, affirming both the Executive’s power to
make executive agreements with other nations and the Executive’s discretion
in implementing these agreements to override state laws and extinguish le-
gal claims.94 In the cases of United States v. Belmont and United States v. Pink,
for example, the Supreme Court upheld the Executive’s authority to pre-
empt state law and assume claims against U.S. nationals that the Soviet
Union had assigned to it via an executive agreement based on diplomatic
correspondence between the two states.95 In Dames & Moore, the Court relied
in part on the Executive’s international law arguments to permit its unilat-
eral suspension of domestic legal claims against Iran, which the Executive
had effected through an executive order implementing an executive agree-
ment with Iran to resolve the hostage crisis.96 Though the Dames & Moore
Court was not clear as to the specific constellation of authorities necessary
for its decision, the statutory texts alone did not suffice to suspend the
claims.97 Instead, the Court explicitly relied upon the Executive’s assertion
that “international agreements settling claims by nationals of one state
against the government of another ‘are established international practice re-
flecting traditional international theory.’ ” 98 Thus, while the Court did not
identify the precise location of the Executive’s authority and also relied on
longstanding congressional acquiescence to practice, the Executive’s interna-
tional law practice of settling claims through international law agreements
was a necessary factor in the Court’s decision (and was the very practice in
which Congress had acquiesced). Recently, the Medellı́n Court reaffirmed
that practice, suggesting that the Court’s comfort in permitting this execu-
tive discretion lay in part in the limitations imposed by the international
agreements themselves.99
93. But see Henkin, supra note 31, at 56 n.68 (arguing that the discretion left to the Executive was
intended to “giv[e] effect not to Executive views of international law but to ‘national policy’ on immu-
nity even if it was contrary to, or not based on or related to, international law”).
94. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981); Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S.
396 (2003); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937);
see also Medellı́n v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 531-32 (2008) (acknowledging “[t]he Executive’s narrow and
strictly limited authority to settle international claims disputes pursuant to an executive agreement”);
Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, supra note 83.
95. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324; Pink, 315 U.S. 203.
96. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 686.
97. Id. at 675.
98. Id. at 679 (quoting Henkin, supra note 31, at 262).
99. Medellı́n, 552 U.S. at 531 (stating as a basis for the distinction that “the limitations on this source
of executive power are clearly set forth”). The Medellı́n Court did not explain why neither the Vienna
Convention on Consular Affairs nor the International Court of Justice opinion interpreting it were them-
selves at least as clearly limiting if not more so than the executive agreements at issue in the prior cases.
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4. International Law Replacement of Domestic Rules
Finally, the fourth mechanism I identify is the replacement of an ordinary
domestic legal framework with a different legal framework drawn from in-
ternational law. Replacement is similar to the displacement and exception
mechanisms, but differs in a few key respects. Unlike displacement, dis-
cussed above, under which international law is invoked only at an initial
stage to alter the ordinary course of events, replacement involves both dis-
rupting the ordinary course of domestic law and then replacing the domestic
rules with international law. Replacement is also distinct from the exception
mechanism, in which specific domestic norms purportedly continue to oper-
ate but with individualized exceptions that are sized to what international
law permits. Replacement, by contrast, effects an entire framework shift,
under which an entire set of rules is replaced wholesale with another. Such a
replacement does not necessitate that the new legal framework drawn from
international law will be either more or less constraining than the domestic
framework. But when the international law framework is more permissive
than the domestic legal framework it replaces, this exchange of one set of
limitations for another can lead to an expansion of executive authority and a
weakening of individual protections, albeit one that is intended, again, to
expand only to the limits of what international law permits of the state.100
An example is the longstanding substitution of an international law-
based regime of administrative detention and military commissions in the
place of ordinary criminal process for individuals whom the Executive seeks
to capture and detain in its prosecution of an armed conflict. Under this
mechanism, international law serves first as a justification for the shift of
legal framework. In this case, that justification rests on the twin executive
determinations of the existence of an armed conflict and the labeling of a
particular individual as an enemy combatant101 in that conflict. With re-
spect to both of these determinations, the Executive (and courts when in-
100. The courts have engaged repeatedly in recent years when the Executive was seen to overstep the
international law limits on the use of military commissions, to mixed effect. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rum-
sfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (invalidating the President’s unilateral use of military commissions); Medellı́n,
552 U.S. 491 (Stevens, J., concurring) (questioning the extent to which the crime at issue was a valid law
of war offense); al Bahlul v. United States, 767 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (raising questions regarding the
extent to which the Executive can rely upon a congressional statute to prosecute an individual in a
military commission on a charge that is not an established war crime under international law).
101. Note that the Obama Administration ceased using the term “enemy combatant” at least in
certain contexts, such as the Guantánamo habeas litigation, but it has nevertheless continued to rely on
the concept of enemy combatant status for the purposes of detention and targeting in the current con-
flict. See, e.g., March 13 Brief, supra note 10 (dropping the “enemy combatant” label but nevertheless
continuing to assert broad authority to militarily detain members and supporters of Al Qaeda and
Taliban forces); Preston Testimony, supra note 55 (“[I]n our ongoing armed conflict against al-Qaeda,
the Taliban and associated forces, the United States military relies on the authority of the AUMF to hold
enemy belligerents in military detention in Afghanistan and at the detention facility at Guantánamo
Bay, Cuba.”); Koh, supra note 63 (“[I]ndividuals who are part of . . . an armed group are belligerents
and, therefore, lawful targets under international law.”).
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volved102) typically invokes international law as the substantive body of law
that provides the standard under which these concepts should be
understood.103
International law next provides the replacement legal framework that
stands in lieu of the usual domestic legal architecture. Particularly relevant
here is its replacement of the ordinary operation of domestic criminal pro-
cess, including Miranda warnings, charge, presentment, trial, sentence, and
accompanying fundamental constitutional rights, such as the right to a jury
trial and counsel, for those who would otherwise merit them.104 In the place
of this domestic legal framework stand two entirely different detention re-
gimes both justified and governed largely by international law: the first is
an administrative detention regime under which the Executive may detain
an individual with minimal process not for crimes committed, but instead
based on status as an “enemy combatant” until the “end of hostilities,”
both of which it defines by reference to international law; the second is a
military commission regime, under which individuals may be charged and
tried by military courts, outside of regular criminal process, for violations of
the international laws of war.105
102. The executive branch has generally demanded—and often received—deference on these ques-
tions. See, e.g., Brief for Respondents at 25, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (No. 03-6696) (arguing
that the “determination that an individual is an enemy combatant” is a “quintessentially military judg-
ment, representing a core exercise of the Commander-in-Chief authority”); Brief for Appellees at 17, al
Bihani v. Obama, 509 F.3d 866 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (No. 09-5051) (“[T]he determination of whether a
conflict has ended is a matter ‘of political judgment for which judges have neither technical competence
nor official responsibility.’ ”) (citing Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 170 (1948)). In other cases
judicial review may be absent entirely. See, e.g., DOJ White Paper, supra note 67, at 10 (stating that
“there exists no appropriate judicial forum to evaluate the[ ] constitutional considerations” involved in
the targeted killing of a U.S. citizen abroad in the conflict with Al Qaeda, and that judicial intervention
might require a court “inappropriately” to interfere in executive branch warmaking).
103. See, e.g., March 13 Brief, supra note 10 (arguing that “principles derived from law-of-war rules
governing international armed conflicts,” which have “been codified in treaties such as the Geneva Con-
ventions or become customary international law . . . must inform the interpretation of the [Executive’s]
detention authority . . . .”); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 27–30, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426
(2004) (No. 03-1027) (arguing that the President’s ability to seize and detain “enemy combatants” is
well-settled under laws of war and thus comes within his Article II powers); Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 631
(holding that conflict with Al Qaeda was a “conflict not of an international character” covered by Com-
mon Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions). With respect to the determination that the United States is
currently engaged in an armed conflict with Al Qaeda, the Executive has not articulated a clear legal
standard under which it makes this determination, but it has suggested that its understanding is guided
by international law principles. See, e.g., Brief for Appellees at 18, Al-Bihani, 509 F.3d 866 (N. 09-5051)
(noting that “the laws of war focus on the cessation of ‘hostilities,’ which continue in Afghanistan”); July
OLC Memorandum, supra note 1, at 25–26 (citing Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1AR72, Decision R
on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia, App. Chamber Oct. 2, 1995)) (looking to international law sources including jurisprudence
from the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia for guidance on the existence and
geographic scope of an armed conflict).
104. Due process and habeas rights are likewise significantly narrowed, as will be discussed infra Part
I.C.1. For federal crimes this also includes supervision by an Article III judge. See, e.g., Vladeck, supra
note 17.
105. See, e.g., Military Commissions Act of 2009 § 948(c) (2009) (identifying as subject to military
commissions “[a]ny alien unprivileged enemy belligerent”); id. § 948(b) (specifying the purpose “of
military commissions to try alien unprivileged enemy belligerents for violations of the law of war and
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All of these mechanisms can work in tandem with others discussed in this
Article. For example, in the current conflict with Al Qaeda, the Executive’s
power to effect the replacement mechanism relies in part upon an expansive
statutory interpretation of the AUMF, as discussed in Section 1. Similarly,
its compliance with constitutional and statutory protections for individuals
relies on the exceptions it infers to these constraints discussed in Section
2.106
As a matter of practice, these mechanisms are not new. During the Civil
War, for example, Lincoln’s Administration looked to the international laws
of war to justify a naval blockade on the South through unilateral executive
action, seizure of property without compensation, and detention of Confed-
erate soldiers without ordinary criminal process; in the place of the ordinary
operation of domestic law it imposed a legal framework based instead in
international law and looked to that law to determine the outer bounds of
its authority.107 In World War II, the Executive relied upon the interna-
tional laws of war to try by military commission on U.S. soil, convict, and
execute several individuals (including at least one U.S. citizen) as “unlawful
combatants,” without the benefit of certain constitutional protections like
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.108
D. Unsuccessful Attempts at Empowerment
The cases discussed up to this point have involved successful invocations
of international law to effect an enhancement of executive power. But not all
invocations of international law for these purposes have met with such suc-
cess. The Executive has made many unsuccessful attempts to enhance its au-
thority through reliance on international law to alter or displace domestic
rules and constraints. The Executive’s failed attempts at the empowerment
phenomenon are significant simply because executive legal arguments that
other offenses triable by military commission”); see also Dep’t of Justice & Dep’t of Defense, Deter-
mination of Guantánamo Cases Referred for Prosecution, http://www.justice.gov/opa/docu-
ments/taba-prel-rpt-dptf-072009.pdf (explaining the framework under which the Department of Defense
and the Department of Justice would assess whether individuals would be prosecuted in a military com-
mission or Article III court); Hamdan, 548 U.S. 557; Vladeck, supra note 17 (arguing that the Article III
exception for military commissions should be grounded in international law).
106. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); al Bahlul v. United States, 767 F.3d 1 (D.C.
Cir. 2014).
107. See, e.g., The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635 (1862); Thomas Lee & Michael Ramsey, The Story of the
Prize Cases: Executive Action and Judicial Review in Wartime, in Presidential Power Stories (Curtis
Bradley & Chris Schroeder eds., 2009); Golove, supra note 17, at 385 (“[I]t was on the theory that the
President, as commander in chief, may exercise the lawful belligerent rights of the United States under
international law that Lincoln justified the imposition of a naval blockade on Southern ports, the seizure
and destruction of vast quantities of property located in the South as enemy property, and even the
Emancipation Proclamation.”); Andrew Kent, The Constitution and the Laws of War During the Civil War,
85 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1839, 1886 (2010) (arguing that “the Constitution itself called into play a
new legal regime during wartime, the laws of war, which fleshed out the broad and vague constitutional
provisions granting war powers and provided the applicable rules guiding the government’s military
measures”).
108. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 37–39 (1942).
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see the light of day or are subject to judicial review represent only the tip of
the iceberg. Considering the vast quantity of legal decision making that
happens inside the black box of the executive branch, any glimpse into exec-
utive lawyering is edifying and provides insight into the kind of legal argu-
ments executive officials find reasonable or salient, and thus may be relying
upon internally.109 As evidence of the significance, one need only consider
the fact that the Executive’s legal analysis of its authority to target and kill
U.S. citizens, which employs several of the mechanisms discussed in this
Article, was never intended for public consumption, much less judicial re-
view.110 The Executive’s attempt to use these arguments, even as unsuccess-
ful litigation positions, is often the only information the public receives
regarding the Executive’s analysis of its own authority. It thus provides the
public with a tiny wedge into understanding the complex web of lawyering
and policymaking that happens away from public view or judicial oversight.
Executive invocation of the empowerment phenomenon for the purpose of
compliance with that law might provide less potential for abuse than em-
powerment for other purposes. Yet the Executive has, in many instances,
met resistance to its invocation of international law for the purposes of com-
pliance, from Washington’s failed attempts to prosecute violators of neutral-
ity111 to recent cases involving free speech and religious rights.112
A well-known example of the Executive’s unsuccessful attempt to invoke
international law to expand domestic authority is the case of Medellı́n v.
Texas.113 Medellı́n addressed a failure by the state of Texas to provide consu-
lar visits in accordance with the Vienna Convention of Consular Affairs to an
alien criminally convicted and sentenced to death.114 The International
Court of Justice (“ICJ”) had previously found the United States in breach of
this obligation, and ordered a remedy through the state’s criminal process.115
109. See, e.g., Rebecca Ingber, Interpretation Catalysts and Executive Branch Legal Decisionmaking, 38
Yale J. Int’l L. 359 (2013) (describing the vast array of legal decision making that takes place inside
the executive outside of litigation or public view).
110. See supra Part I.C.2.
111. In the Neutrality Crisis of 1793, Washington imposed a position of strict neutrality via execu-
tive fiat and asserted that, despite the lack of a statute criminalizing the conduct, he would prosecute all
violators. Proclamation of Neutrality 1793, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/neutra93.asp (last
visited Oct. 2, 2015) [hereinafter Neutrality Proclamation of 1793]. The ensuing prosecutions received
the imprimatur of several justices, including the Chief Justice, yet ultimately resulted in jury nullifica-
tion. See, e.g., Henfield’s Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6360) (jury charge delivered by
Chief Justice John Jay). Cf. Richard H. Fallon et al., Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts
and the Federal System 608-14 (6th ed. 2009) (discussing the ultimate rejection of federal common
law crimes in United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812)).
112. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988) (dismissing the Executive’s attempted reliance on
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Rights as a compelling interest sufficient to repel a First Amend-
ment challenge to a statute prohibiting certain acts of protest outside embassies in the District of Colum-
bia); Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006) (dismissing the
Executive’s attempted reliance on a treaty obligation as a “compelling interest” sufficient to justify a
burden on religious exercise under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993).
113. Medellı́n v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
114. Id.
115. Id.; see Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31).
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The executive branch took the position that the underlying treaty was not
self-executing (and thus did not itself create judicially enforceable domestic
law), but that the President could unilaterally choose to give it such effect
by issuing a memorandum to the Attorney General directing that the states
comply with the ICJ opinion.116 The Executive’s (ultimately unsuccessful)
position to the Court was that the President himself could, through such
action, choose to make that obligation enforceable and thus override con-
trary state law.117 The Executive’s argument would have placed complete
authority in the hands of the President over the decision whether and when
to override domestic law in order to comply with an international obliga-
tion.118 It located this power in the President’s “authority to implement the
Optional Protocol and the U.N. Charter.”119 The Court did not agree, and
held that contrary to the government’s assertion of authority, the President
could not unilaterally choose to give effect to an international obligation
that was not otherwise domestically enforceable in order to “establish bind-
ing rules of decision that preempt contrary state law.”120
Often congressional action has provided the remedy for such failed at-
tempts. Historically, Congress has acted many times when unilateral execu-
tive action has failed: from the Neutrality Act of 1794, enacted to bolster
Washington’s proclamation of Neutrality, to the Military Commissions Act
of 2006, enacted in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan
striking down the President’s unilateral establishment of military commis-
sions. As Part III discusses further, congressional action—either to imple-
ment international law or to aid executive action in reliance upon it—is a
useful means of balancing executive discretion with individual rights and
separation of powers concerns in areas in which the international and domes-
tic realms collide. Of course, it is not always effective. In Medellı́n, for exam-
ple, the Court directly suggested congressional action as the appropriate
means of implementing the international law obligation at issue in that case,
but as of yet Congress has failed to act and the United States continues to
struggle to remedy the breach that the ICJ found in Avena.
116. Medellı́n v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Support-
ing Petitioner, Medellı́n v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008) (No. 06-984); see also Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon,
548 U.S. 331, 338–40 (2006).
117. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 5, Medellı́n v. Texas, 552
U.S. 491 (No. 06-984).
118. Id. (“[T]he President is authorized to determine whether and how to comply with the ICJ’s
decision.”).
119. Id. at 4, 27–29.
120. Medellı́n, 552 U.S. at 530 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 5, Medellı́n v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (No. 06-984)).
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***
Although perhaps counterintuitive, a consistent theme emerging from
these examples is that the expectation of international law’s force as a con-
straint and its use as a limiting principle often underlie its invocation to
enhance authority. The assurance of international law constraint acts as se-
curity that the Executive’s asserted authority will not be entirely un-
bounded. The following Parts II and III address the extent to which
international law truly fulfills that role and serves as a sufficient limiting
principle in these domestic contexts, and the extent to which it may act as
an appropriate determiner of the outer bounds of domestic executive power.
II. Dangers in the Empowerment Phenomenon
While the enhancement described in Part I can be a dramatic phenome-
non, it is neither new nor always problematic. And while we should not try
to extinguish it without regard for context, there are aspects of this phenom-
enon that can lead to abuse, with dangerous effects for the separation of
powers, the rule of law, and individual rights. This Part explores some of the
dangers lurking in this phenomenon, the circumstances under which we
need to be particularly vigilant, and the overlooked hazards of dismissing
international law as irrelevant in the domestic sphere. One demonstrable
conclusion we can draw from the enhancement phenomenon is that all actors
concerned with domestic law—and in particular those concerned with exec-
utive power and individual rights—must engage with international law and
undertake a nuanced understanding of both the substantive content itself
and how it interacts with the domestic system.
This section describes three primary areas of concern in the use of interna-
tional law to enhance and enable domestic authority. First, “international
law” is itself a broad term covering a vast expanse of rules and norms in an
array of forms, many of which are not conducive to acting as sole constraints
on intrastate actors. Second, the use of international law in the domestic
system can aggrandize executive power through the Executive’s interpretive
discretion, effectively leaving the Executive responsible in some cases for
interpreting the parameters of its own domestic authority. Third, the em-
powerment phenomenon can obscure the legal reasoning behind executive
positions and distract or mollify the very actors who would otherwise cri-
tique and check executive power.
A. International Law as Insufficient Check on Executive Power
Reliance on international law as a check on executive discretion or as a
limiting principle in lieu of other domestic constraints hinges in part on the
expectation that international law and other external forces will operate as
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true constraints. This perception is based in part in the genuine role that
international law plays in checking state action on the global stage.121 Exec-
utive overreach is thus ascribed to a simple failure to impose or to observe
international law limits.122 This may sometimes be true, but it is not the
full picture. The role that international law plays in checking state action is
often entirely distinct from—and addresses questions that are different
from—matters of the Executive’s internal domestic powers vis-à-vis individ-
uals or the other branches. “International law” is a broad field covering a
vast expanse of rules and norms. Many of these norms are not conducive to
acting as sole constraints on government actors, nor are they tailored for that
purpose. Others are far more permissive than the corresponding domestic
norm. Though there may be cases in which it is the only option, interna-
tional law is often at best an imperfect replacement for domestic legal con-
straints or determiner of the proper outer bounds of domestic executive
power, for the following reasons:
First, international law is not, as a rule, intended to address questions
regarding the internal balance of power within the state. States have distinct
internal structures, and international law generally does not speak to these
domestic power dynamics. It makes logical sense that rules governing what
the state may permissibly do should constrain domestic actors to act within
those bounds, but these rules should not necessarily define the extent of a
given domestic actor’s power or the balance of that power vis-à-vis others.
Second, much of international law, outside of specific substantive areas,
developed historically to govern and facilitate relations between states, not
the relationship between states and individuals within those states. While in
the modern era states have developed international human rights norms to
regulate state conduct toward those subject to state authority, historically
most international law did not develop with the intent of regulating that
relationship. Even international law norms that do address the states’ actions
toward individuals, such as the laws governing armed conflict, may carve
out from their scope of application individuals who are presumed protected
by the state’s domestic laws or diplomatic relations.123
Third, even in areas where both international law and domestic law regu-
late the relationship between the state and individuals subject to its control,
international law may be much more permissive than U.S. domestic law.
This is logical, since international treaties such as human rights instruments
121. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 Yale L.J. 2599
(1997); Thomas Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (1990).
122. See supra note 17 at sources cited therein.
123. See, e.g., Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
art. 4, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (describing the scope of this convention as
providing protections for individuals who “find themselves . . . in the hands of a Party to the conflict or
Occupying Power of which they are not nationals” and likewise exempting from protection the nationals
of states who retain “normal diplomatic representation” with the detaining state) [hereinafter Fourth
Geneva Convention].
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are the result of multilateral negotiation and compromise by the drafting
parties, and can thus only represent the minimum of what the drafters were
willing to accept. Human rights instruments are ultimately intended to op-
erate as an additional overlay of constraint atop domestic rules, which may
and often do provide significantly greater and more detailed regulation than
international law norms. (Of course, these instruments are particularly im-
portant in states or contexts otherwise lacking such domestic protections.)
Compare for example the general prohibition on the use in legal proceedings
of evidence derived from torture under the Convention Against Torture
(“CAT”) with the exclusionary rule under U.S. constitutional law; the latter
goes much further than the international law rule by prohibiting not just
evidence derived from torture but in fact any involuntary statements and
even the fruits of such statements.124 A displacement, rather than an overlay,
of this particular human rights provision would have entailed a lessening
instead of a heightening of protection.125
Fourth, international law has historically been understood to operate in
many spheres not as a granter of authority for states but rather as a prohibi-
tive force on state action. That is, unlike in the U.S. domestic structure
where federal actors must be specifically granted power under the Constitu-
tion,126 in the international sphere states were historically presumed free to
act unless their actions were proscribed by a principle of international law.127
124. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
art. 15, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; Message from the Presi-
dent of the United States Transmitting the Convention Against Torture and Inhuman Treatment or
Punishment, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, at 14–15 (1988) (“The U.S. rules against admissibility of
illegally obtained evidence and involuntary confessions are stricter than is provided for under the Con-
vention.”). Of course, international law may also go further than domestic law constraints. For example,
the United States in its same Senate transmittal package suggested an “understanding” to article 16 of
the Convention because it contained a requirement that was “arguably broader than existing U.S. law.”
Id. at 15–16.
125. The rule is nevertheless an important protection, not only for foreign states which do not have
any domestic law on point, but for the United States itself in areas such as Guantánamo where it may
understand its CAT obligation, but not its constitutional exclusionary rule, to operate. See U.S. Dep’t of
State, United States Written Response to Questions Asked by the Committee Against Torture (Apr. 28,
2006), www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/68554.htm (recognizing the application of the CAT exclusionary rule to
proceedings at Guantánamo).
126. See M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819) (The U.S. federal government is
“one of enumerated powers. . . . [I]t can exercise only the powers granted to it . . . .”).
127. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7), at 18 (“The rules of law binding
upon States . . . emanate from their own free will as expressed in conventions or by usages generally
accepted as expressing principles of law. . . . Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot there-
fore be presumed.”). This general rule is debated. Many scholars have historically argued in favor of a
theory of completeness of international law. See, e.g., Hersch Lauterpacht, Some Observations on the Prohibi-
tion of ‘Non Liquet’ and the Completeness of the Law, Simbolk Verzijl 196–221 (1958). Nevertheless,
international law jurisprudence and practice includes the possibility, even advisability, of “non liquet,”
under which “an international tribunal should decline to decide a case where rules are not available for its
determination because of gaps or lacunae in international law.” Parry & Grant, Encyclopedic Dic-
tionary of International Law (1986). See, e.g., International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion: Legal-
ity of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 35 I.L.M. 4, 926 (July 1996) (declining to issue a final ruling on
the legality of the use of nuclear weapons).
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This principle (and the related question as to whether international law
should be considered “complete” or to contain gaps) is a matter of signifi-
cant debate, but it is nevertheless one that states rely upon and seek to
preserve.128 And critical sources have in recent years recognized the existence
of gaps in international law in specific contexts.129 Simply importing what
international law permits wholesale into a domestic law grant of author-
ity—in other words providing the Executive with authority to act to the
limits of international law—could in some contexts entail an importation of
the gaps along with the constraints. This could result in a blank check of
domestic authority to the Executive. So, for example, went the argument by
Bush administration officials in the early years of the conflict with Al
Qaeda: the President claimed both Article II and statutory authority to use
force against Al Qaeda, including at a minimum all the authority assumed
under the international laws of war. But since those laws of war did not
protect these nonstate actors, administration officials argued, there were no
legal constraints at all on the President’s treatment of such individuals.130
Fifth, the compliance and enforcement checking mechanisms of interna-
tional law are distinct from those of domestic law. While it is true that both
public international law and public domestic law engage matters that are
judicially enforceable and those that are not,131 the enforcement mechanisms
that operate outside of courts are different in each sphere. For international
law, the checks on the state will include the oversight of international orga-
nizations and the actions of other states in the international community—
their diplomatic activities, their expectations of reciprocity, their approval
or opprobrium, economic and other sanctions, even the threat of war.132 Yet
these checking functions engage primarily when other states have a real in-
terest in the matter at hand.133 Other states and players on the international
128. See, e.g., Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Written Statement of the Government of
the United States, at 8 (June 20, 1995), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/8700.pdf (asserting the
“fundamental principle of international law that restrictions on States cannot be presumed but must be
found in conventional law specifically accepted by them or in customary law generally accepted by the
community of nations”).
129. See, e.g., Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226,
926 (July 8) (failing to “conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be
lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would
be at stake”).
130. See Memorandum from George Bush on the Humane Treatment of Al Qaeda and Taliban De-
tainees (Feb. 7, 2002), http://www.pegc.us/archive/White_Bouse/bush_memo_20020207_ed.pdf.
131. See Goldsmith & Levinson, supra note 15.
132. See, e.g., Oona Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, Outcasting: Enforcement in Domestic and International
Law, 121 Yale L.J. 252 (2011); cf. Edward T. Swaine, The Constitutionality of International Delegations,
104 Colum. L. Rev. 1492 (2004) (analogizing the potential checking functions of international institu-
tions to those of domestic federalism).
133. Even in areas subject to judicial review, states—not individuals—are often the critical actors.
For example, only states may be parties to cases before the International Court of Justice. Statute of the
International Court of Justice, art. 34(1).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\57-1\HLI105.txt unknown Seq: 35 12-APR-16 10:15
2016 / International Law Constraints as Executive Power 83
plane—outside of the human rights monitoring context134—are far less
likely to engage the United States aggressively over a matter of its own
domestic activities or legal interpretations. Thus the President’s use of inter-
national law interpretation to justify the detention of an American citizen is
far less likely to garner international outcry or pushback abroad on the spe-
cific international law interpretation at issue than would the President’s in-
vocation of similar arguments to detain foreign nationals or to use force in
another state’s territory without consent.
Sixth, the international law invoked may not speak directly to specific
domestic law matters for which it is employed nor provide the clear limiting
principles suggested. Take, for example, the Department of Justice’s due
process analysis in the targeted killing memoranda: in lieu of existing do-
mestic constraints on executive action and strict protections for individual
rights and process, the Executive reserves sole discretion to define, impose,
and adjudicate a substantive standard that relies on internal, secret interpre-
tation of international law rules.135 The international law theories discussed
in the memoranda are substantive standards for who might be lawfully
targeted and under what conditions. These are not procedural standards for
making that determination and ensuring its accuracy. This is something of a
tautology: certain individuals the Executive deems legitimate targets may
lawfully receive less process to determine whether they truly are legitimate
targets.136
Similarly the memoranda rely to some degree upon the Executive’s evolv-
ing and sharply contested international law theory of imminence—devel-
oped to justify the use of force in another state’s sovereign territory under
the U.N. Charter137—in order to satisfy the domestic law requirements of
the Fourth Amendment, under which deadly force may in limited circum-
stances be used against individuals who pose an immediate threat. One is an
134. In the context of human rights treaty body reporting, for example, states must report their
domestic compliance with treaty obligations to the treaty monitoring committees.
135. See supra Part I.C.2.
136. See July 2010 OLC Memorandum, supra note 1; Feb. 2010 OLC Memorandum, supra note 64. It R
is clear only that, whatever the Executive has in mind by the process due to individuals that is contem-
plated by these standards, it is certainly not judicial process. See supra note 70 at sources cited therein; see
also Eric Holder, Speech at the Northwestern University School of Law (Mar. 5, 2012) (“ ‘Due process’
and ‘judicial process’ are not one and the same, particularly when it comes to national security. The
Constitution guarantees due process, not judicial process.”).
137. The United States currently takes the view that the U.N. Charter exception to the prohibition
on the use of force for responses in self-defense to an “armed attack” can be met by an imminent threat of
attack and asserts a broader understanding of “imminence” than that of its allies. See, e.g., Brennan,
Remarks at Harvard Law School, supra note 9; U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4, 51; Ben Emmerson (Special
Rapporteur on Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Coun-
tering Terrorism), Third Annual Rep., ¶¶ 57–58, U.N. Doc. A/68/389 (Sept. 18, 2013) [hereinafter
Emerson Report] (noting the lack of “clear international consensus [on] the scope of the right to antici-
patory self-defence” and stating that “while the United States appears to accept that resort to anticipa-
tory self-defence is constrained by the principle of imminence, it interprets this standard as a flexible
one”). See generally Michael N. Schmitt, Preemptive Strategies in International Law, 24 Mich. J. Int’l L. 513
(2003).
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evolving standard involving state sovereignty; the other is a constitutional
protection for individuals. These are apples and oranges, and yet one is used
to help define the parameters of the other.
Finally, the international legal principles governing a number of the areas
explored in this Article—from the doctrines of sovereign and foreign official
immunity138 to the laws governing conflicts with nonstate actors—are or
have been historically in a state of great flux and controversy, another reason
international law is not always well-suited to act as the sole constraint on
executive authority. International law is not some exogenous, pure entity
that imposes constraints on states in a perfectly clear, binary way, where
compliance and violation are the only two options. Instead, and in particular
in the area of customary international law, it can be an interactive and dy-
namic dance among states, where aggressive interpretation and even viola-
tion of law all play a part in its evolution. In fact, this aspect of international
law is one reason the U.S. domestic system generally cedes to the Executive
significant discretion over its interpretation. Yet for those very reasons, rely-
ing on international law as a sole constraint in the domestic sphere entails
placing significant domestic authority in the hands of the President. This
facet of the phenomenon will be explored further in the next section.
B. International Law Interpretation as Empowerment
The Constitution generally entrusts the President with executing—not
making—the law. Of course, there is significant debate over where the one
ends and the other begins, and the devil is often in the details. Certainly,
Congress delegates to agencies within the executive branch a vast amount of
authority, and interpreting the scope of that authority is, to a large extent,
understood to be an executive prerogative.139 Interpretation of law itself is
necessary to its execution and the power to interpret entails some core power
to effect legal change in both large and small ways.140 The amalgamation of
phenomena described in this Article—in which international law, inter-
preted largely by the executive branch, is invoked to understand domestic
authority—leaves the executive branch with significant authority to deter-
mine the outer parameters of its own domestic power. Perhaps not surpris-
ingly, the executive at times relies upon international law interpretations
that are sharply contested and that provide the President with significant
flexibility and authority, at times well beyond what many might construe
either international law or domestic law to permit.
138. See, e.g., Bradley & Helfer, supra note 92, at 248 (describing law of foreign official immunity as
“unsettled and rapidly evolving”); Wuerth, supra note 83.
139. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984).
140. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 413–27 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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1. International Law Triggers the Deference Reflex
The dangers in the international law empowerment phenomenon dis-
cussed in this section are compounded to an immeasurable degree by the
role that international law plays in triggering the reflex—by courts and
Congress—to defer to executive interpretation and discretion.
There is a longstanding debate in scholarship and practice over the extent
to which the executive branch should receive deference to its activities in the
realm of foreign affairs and national security, and to a lesser degree over
whether it should receive such deference on matters of international law
interpretation.141 In practice, and despite their mandate “to say what the
law is,”142 courts often defer considerably to executive positions on interna-
tional law interpretation.143 This may rest in part on the “sole organ” doc-
trine: the desire that “the United States speak with one voice” in this
realm.144 It may also lie in part in the means through which international
custom evolves, whereby the Executive’s actions and statements of law can
have the effect of “creating or modifying international law.”145 Whatever
the underlying purpose, in many areas where judicial oversight of executive
action ostensibly exists, while the Executive’s interpretation does not always
wholly determine the judicial outcome, courts have nevertheless historically
given the executive interpretation “great weight,” and that interpretation is
often dispositive of the matter at hand.146
Moreover there are some areas in which the Executive simply acts alone
with little or no oversight of its legal positions. In addition to those areas
where courts may engage but defer to executive interpretations, executive
141. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 Yale L.J.
1170 (2007) (arguing that the President should receive “Chevron deference” on matters of foreign affairs);
Curtis Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 Va. L. Rev. 649 (arguing that the “Chevron”
model of deference from administrative law provides insights into understanding the Court’s deference to
the executive in the foreign affairs realm); Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 112
cmt. c (1987). But see Deborah Pearlstein, After Deference: Formalizing the Judicial Power for Foreign Relations
Law, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 783 (2011) (critiquing the suggestion of a “Chevron” framework for deference
in the foreign affairs realm).
142. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
143. See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 112 cmt. c (1987). In recent
years scholars have suggested the Court may be rethinking the level of deference to afford the Executive
in foreign affairs. See, e.g., Pearlstein, supra note 141 (arguing that in many critical cases the Supreme
Court has not shown significant deference to executive interpretations of treaties or of statutes implicat-
ing foreign affairs); Harlan Cohen, Formalism and Distrust: Foreign Affairs Law in the Roberts Court, 83
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 380 (2015); Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid B. Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign
Relations Law, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 1897 (2015).  The Court’s recent decision in Zivotofsky is fodder for a
counternarrative to these arguments. See Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II), 135 S. Ct.
2076, 2096 (2015) (finding exclusive executive power over recognition of foreign states).
144. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (quoting a
speech by Marshall to Congress, “The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations,
and its sole representative with foreign nations”); Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law
§ 112 cmt. c (1987).
145. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, § 112 cmt. c (1987).
146. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 141, at 701 n.224, 707 n.249 (citing cases); Restatement (Third)
of Foreign Relations Law, § 326(2) (1987).
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interpretation also takes place in contexts where the courts may never see the
matter at hand at all, or may abdicate to the political branches on other
grounds, with the frequent effect of leaving such decisions in the hands of
the Executive.147 Congress for its part has shown little appetite for engaging
or dissecting the Executive’s international law interpretation in many of the
critical areas discussed in this Article.148
The Executive thus often has significant discretion in interpreting what
international law requires—and permits—of the United States. Though the
rationale for this flexibility may lie largely in a desire to grant the Executive
flexibility on the international plane, the phenomena discussed here demon-
strate that this authority has ripple effects in domestic law. And to the ex-
tent that international law is used as a means of defining the parameters of
domestic executive authority, deference or abdication to the Executive on
the content of that international law means ceding to the Executive signifi-
cant discretion to define the parameters of its domestic power.
2. International Law in Flux and the Power of Interpretation
The Executive’s flexibility in interpreting international law—based
largely in judicial deference and congressional acquiescence to executive po-
sitions—is often further compounded by the evolving state of that interna-
tional law.
As with many areas of law, international law compliance does not operate
in a perfectly binary fashion—compliance or violation. Instead there is a
spectrum, along which sits legal interpretation. While some interpretations
may be uncontroversial or, by contrast, entirely beyond the pale, much legal
interpretation rests in some grey zone between the two.149 Areas of signifi-
cant judicial oversight might see more or less finality in interpretation on at
least some matters, but in many matters of international law multiple inter-
pretations may persist for a significant period. Even where consensus may
start to congeal on the international plane, the United States may neverthe-
less continue to assert a unique view. In many of these areas, and without
necessary regard for whether the position is taken in good faith or is a plau-
sible view of the law, the position taken by the U.S. Executive will be ac-
147. Al Awlaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (dismissing the case on standing and
political question grounds).
148. See, e.g., NDAA 2012, supra note 54 (simply codifying the government’s litigation position on
the Executive’s detention authority standard, which had been accepted by the D.C. Circuit); Authorization
for Use of Military Force After Iraq and Afghanistan: Hearing Before S. Foreign Relations Comm., 113th Cong.
(2014) (questioning the Executive’s position on what groups are covered under the AUMF, but never
questioning the Executive’s international law interpretation of its authority); Harold Hongju Koh, Why
the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 Yale L.J. 1255
(1988); cf. FSIA, supra note 23 (codifying the Executive’s international law approach to foreign state
immunity in U.S. courts).
149. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Presidential Power, Historical Practice, and Legal
Constraint, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 1097, 1114–17 (2013) (noting the difficulty in distinguishing executive
non-compliance from mere disagreement over interpretation).
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cepted by some and sharply contested by others. The evolving state of
international law in many of the areas discussed in this Article exacerbates
the Executive’s flexibility in this realm, granting it greater discretion to
argue that its interpretation is simply one among many and well within an
accepted margin of appreciation, rather than a true outlier.150
This phenomenon, and the resulting potential for aggrandizement of ex-
ecutive power, is no anomaly. Throughout history the Executive has asserted
controversial international law positions and concomitant enhanced domes-
tic authority. An early example is President Washington’s proclamation of
neutrality in the face of war between England and France in 1793. In order
to avoid being drawn into the war, Washington imposed on the nation a
disposition of strict neutrality through executive fiat, in the Neutrality
Proclamation of 1793.151 He relied in part for this unilateral action on the
assertion that strict neutrality was a “duty” required by the law of nations,
one under which he additionally derived authority to prosecute violators.152
Yet the international law from which Washington derived the nation’s neu-
trality obligations was far from clear. In fact, Washington’s position re-
quired parsing a number of controversial legal questions, including the
status of treaty obligations that the United States owed the belligerents as
well as the aggressiveness of the neutrality required by international law.153
As it happened, the Washington Administration chose a position that ac-
corded with its policy interests in staying out of the war; moreover, couch-
ing this policy as a legal obligation included the additional political
advantage of attributing its policy to an external source when defending its
actions to the warring parties. Scholars have thus long argued over the ex-
tent to which Washington was simply attempting to enforce the state’s obli-
gations under international law, or instead strategically employing
international law to impose a policy he deemed important.154 He may very
well have been doing both. Certainly he deemed reliance on international
law essential to his asserted authority, as did Chief Justice John Jay and
150. Cf. Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance
with International Regulatory Agreements 10–13 (1995) (asserting that treaty parties may even
“take advantage of the indeterminacy of treaty language to justify indulging their preferred course of
action”).
151. Neutrality Proclamation of 1793, supra note 111.
152. Id.; see Robert Reinstein, Executive Power and the Law of Nations in the Washington Administration,
46 U. Rich. L. Rev. 373 (2012).
153. In fact many viewed the law and state practice as favoring benevolent and not strict neutrality.
Reinstein, Washington Administration, supra note 152, at 391–400.
154. See, e.g., id. at 377 (noting and rejecting a longstanding scholarly view that “[i]nasmuch as no
uniform practice among European countries was present that would have required the strict neutrality
decisions made by the Washington [A]dministration, . . . those decisions were discretionary executive
choices”); Prakash & Ramsey, Executive Power, supra note 36, at 328–32 (terming the proclamation a
“policy” decision and stating that law did not require it). Another interpretation of events is depicted in
the musical Hamilton, in which the title character opposes intervention in the conflict. He argues, “We
signed a treaty with a King whose head is now in a basket. Would you like to take it out and ask it?
‘Should we honor our treaty, King Louis’ head?’ ‘Uh . . . do whatever you want, I’m super dead.’” Lin-
Manuel Miranda, Hamilton (Broadway musical lyrics 2015).
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Justice James Wilson, who provided the jury charges in the ensuing (and
unsuccessful) prosecutions.155 Ultimately, Congress ratified Washington’s
actions in the Neutrality Act of 1794.156 In the intervening space the Wash-
ington Administration relied on its own, contested, view of international
law to enhance its authority domestically—to impose a position of neutral-
ity on the nation and to prosecute violations of it without congressional
legislation.
The evolving landscape of foreign immunity doctrine provides a more
current example of international law in flux and of controversial executive
interpretation, in an area where that interpretation is invoked to disrupt the
ordinary course of domestic law. As discussed above, immunity doctrine
within the U.S. domestic system has evolved considerably over the last cen-
tury. Today the Executive retains considerable power in the areas of head-of-
state and foreign official immunity to either suppress or permit to go for-
ward the claims of petitioners for redress against foreign officials through its
substantive decisions regarding the immunity doctrine. The Executive
premises these decisions in part on its understanding of customary interna-
tional law, but its interpretation of that law has evolved over time,157 and its
contemporary position is hardly uncontroversial. In particular, there is ongo-
ing debate among states, scholars, and courts regarding the extent to which
the immunity of foreign officials for their acts (as opposed to for their status)
attaches to conduct that violates jus cogens norms.158 U.S. statements of inter-
est in these cases have to date weighed in against permitting an exception to
immunity, but have not affirmatively argued that jus cogens violations will
necessarily be considered official acts.159 Some U.S. courts have engaged this
international law debate and refused to recognize jus cogens violations as offi-
cial acts meriting immunity;160 others have relied entirely on the Executive’s
interpretation of the state of the law and assertions of immunity.161 The
actor charged with interpreting the international law norm—the courts in
cases governed by the FSIA and those others mentioned above, and the Exec-
utive in head-of-state immunity cases and foreign official immunity cases in
which it continues to command deference—thereby wields significant
power to dictate the outcome of these domestic cases.
Wartime provides numerous aggressive examples of the empowerment
phenomenon. As demonstrated in Part I, the executive branch often asserts
wartime authority to act, at a minimum, to the limits of international law.
155. See, e.g., Henfield’s Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6360).
156. See Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 50, 1 Stat. 381, 381–84.
157. Id.
158. See, e.g., Bradley & Helfer, supra note 92.
159. See, e.g., U.S. Statement of Interest, Yousef v. Samantar, 699 F.3d 763 (4th Cir. 2012) (asserting
that “a jus cogens exception to official-act immunity . . . would . . . be out of step with customary
international law”).
160. See, e.g., Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3d 763 (4th Cir. 2012).
161. See, e.g., Matar v. Dichter, 563 F.3d 9, 15 (2d Cir. 2009).
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And due to a mix of judicial deference, abdication, and congressional acqui-
escence, the content of the particular international law theory espoused by
the Executive is often effectively the only legal constraint on executive au-
thority. In areas where the laws applicable in war are evolving or controver-
sial, such as in nontraditional conflicts like that with Al Qaeda, the
Executive claims significant flexibility in asserting compliance with an ex-
pansive understanding of its own authority.
The Executive relies for its wartime empowerment on its international
law-based assertions of, inter alia, an armed conflict with Al Qaeda; expan-
sion of that conflict both to other “associated forces”162 and, geographically,
to locations beyond the “hot” battlefield;163 status-based detention and
targeting of individuals based on their membership in these groups rather
than for particular acts;164 and the use of force in another state’s territory
against a nonstate actor who poses a broadly-understood “imminent”
threat.165 The substantive international law theories for each of these is-
sues—and in fact every component of the Executive’s asserted legal architec-
ture for the conflict with Al Qaeda—have been the subject of significant
international debate. And in each the Executive puts forward an expansive
view of the United States’—and in effect the Executive’s own166—authority
to act.167 Moreover, in many areas—such as the geographic scope of the
conflict or the constellation of activities that define “membership” in a
162. See supra Part I.A.; infra Part II.C. (discussing the Executive’s co-belligerency rhetoric).
163. See Brennan, supra note 9 (noting the view by “some of our closest allies and partners” that—
contrary to the view of the U.S. Government—the “geographic scope of the conflict [is] limit[ed] . . . to
the ‘hot’ battlefields”); Jennifer Daskal, The Geography of the Battlefield: A Framework for Detention and
Targeting outside the “Hot” Conflict Zone, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1165 (2013) (addressing the “intractable”
debate over the legal scope of the conflict with Al Qaeda).
164. For an extensive discussion of the Government’s proffered international law basis for detention in
the conflict with Al Qaeda and the relationship between this theory and its targeting standards see
Ingber, supra note 17. As an example of a clear outlier, the Executive’s position that it can detain “sub-
stantial supporters” of Al Qaeda cannot be found in any treaty, nor in any modern source on customary
international law, nor is it a position shared by any ally. See, e.g., Canadian Off. of the Judge Advo-
cate Gen., Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels §§ 303, 318
(2001) [hereinafter 2001 Canadian Manual] (defining “combatant”—lawful and unlawful—to “in-
clude[ ] any member of the armed forces, except medical and religious personnel,” as well as “[c]ivilians
who take a direct part in hostilities”); Joint Doctrine & Concepts Ctr., U.K. Ministry of Def.,
The Joint Service Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, ¶¶ 4(2), 4(2)(1) (2004) [hereinafter
U.K. Manual] (employing a similar definition). See generally Nils Melzer, Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross,
Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law
(2009), https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc-002-0990.pdf.
165. See Emmerson Report, supra note 137, ¶¶ 51–76 (discussing the lack of international consen-
sus—and the outlier view of the United States—on matters ranging from the imminence standard for
anticipatory self defense to the geographic scope of the conflict, and noting the lack of clarity over the
U.S. legal standard for status-based targeting in the conflict).
166. The Executive has in recent years asserted reliance on its statutory authority under the AUMF
and not rested on unilateral Article II powers alone. But in interpreting its AUMF authority to extend
essentially to the limits of what international law would permit of the state, the Executive has assumed
the entirety of the state’s power as its own. See supra Part I.B.
167. See Emmerson Report, supra note 137 (discussing international consensus and the outlier view of
the United States on various matters and the lack of clarity for the U.S. legal standard for status-based
targeting in the conflict).
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party to the conflict sufficient to render an individual detainable or target-
able—while the Executive justifies its actions through reliance on interna-
tional law, it has never proffered a specific interpretation of the outer
parameters of the limits of that law.168 In fact, the Executive itself has re-
peatedly acknowledged, and even stressed, the ambiguities and evolving na-
ture of the international law governing this area.169 Yet in significant areas
it holds out these ambiguous, evolving international law theories as provid-
ing the sole constraints on its own domestic authority.
In effect, the operation of normal domestic laws and process, including
constitutional protections regarding deprivation of liberty for citizens and
noncitizens alike, all give way to the Executive’s unilateral and at times
undisclosed theories of international law, theories that need not necessarily
be shared by any foreign state, let alone guided by international consensus.
This is not to say that the Executive’s international law positions are nec-
essarily unreasonable. In fact, the actions of other states in recent months
suggest that there may be increasing convergence on U.S. legal theories re-
garding armed conflict with nonstate actors in other states’ territory.170
However, the capacity of the Executive to take and act upon aggressive posi-
tions that have been hotly contested suggests that international law—and in
particular the Executive’s interpretation of international law—does not al-
ways provide clear, strict, or even well-established outer limits on executive
authority. Consideration of the extent to which international law may be
invoked to enhance executive authority must account for this reality. In ad-
dition, even in areas where there are good and valid reasons to cede signifi-
cant interpretive discretion to the Executive on matters of international law,
the extent to which the Executive should retain that discretion when the
international law in question is invoked to determine the outer bounds of
domestic power must be scrutinized separately.
3. Internal Executive Dynamics Influence Empowerment
That the Executive will take an expansive view of its own authorities
when it can may seem obvious to cynics or proponents of a self-interested,
168. See, e.g., July 2010 OLC Memorandum, supra note 1, at 25 (noting the difficulty of determining
the legal parameters of the “geographic scope” of the current conflict and finding support—though no
limiting principle—by analogy to traditional conflicts; and also asserting al-Awlaki’s membership in a
party to the conflict, as well as his specific operations, without defining which, provides the basis for the
Executive’s targeting authority or the outer bounds of that authority); March 13 Brief, supra note 10
(asserting detention authority over individuals analogous to those detainable in international armed con-
flict under the AUMF “as informed by the laws of war,” but failing to establish outer bounds for the
authority other than disclaiming authority to detain “unwitting supporters”).
169. See, e.g., Brennan, Remarks at Harvard Law School, supra note 9 (noting debates and evolving
positions in the international community over the international law governing the conflict with Al
Qaeda); Bellinger, Address at the London School of Economics, supra note 7 (stressing debates among
critics of U.S. policies regarding the appropriate legal framework for the conflict with Al Qaeda).
170. See supra note 13 at sources cited therein.
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rational actor view of executive authority.171 Yet scholars have demonstrated
that there exist significant internal constraints that cabin executive author-
ity, even in areas where the Executive’s own interpretations of its legal au-
thority rarely see judicial review.172 This is a view I share, with some
reservations about the particulars of how these constraints operate and the
consistency of their effectiveness.
Among these reservations, there are factors unique to this area in which
international and domestic law intertwine, which affect the extent to which
internal checks currently exercise sufficient constraint on executive preroga-
tive. Exploration of this argument will be the subject of future work, but it
is worth pausing here briefly to examine why distinct facets of this interplay
may prompt greater reason for concern regarding unrestrained executive au-
thority.173 The concerns I share here do not rest on a rational actor theory of
the Presidency, which might ascribe the empowerment phenomenon to an
instrumentally-minded unitary Executive grabbing power wherever possi-
ble.174 Rather I see the Executive as an enormous multilithic, living organ-
ism, a conglomeration of diverse views and biases, expertise, and power.175
The empowerment phenomenon can be dangerous in large part because of
the distinct ways that international law, and, specifically, the use of interna-
tional law in the domestic sphere, affects the internal dynamics of executive
decision making within the belly of this beast.
One critical aspect of these internal dynamics is differentiated decision
making. This is commonplace in the executive branch, and particularly ex-
acerbated in the context of national security decision making, where many
groups and layers of actors operate throughout the executive branch.176 Dif-
ferent components of the executive rely upon others to provide content or
expertise; this operates both as a vertical matter (e.g., between higher-level
political actors and lower-level “action officers”) as well as a horizontal one
(e.g., between different agencies, offices within those agencies, and actors
with distinct portfolios within those offices). Thus it is not only possible but
commonplace for one set of executive actors, lacking a certain expertise or
mandate, to rely upon, without necessarily dissecting, the sign-off of another
171. See generally Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Executive Unbound: After the
Madisonian Republic (2010); Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, The Limits of Interna-
tional Law (2005).
172. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (citing a range of views on the efficacy of internal
checks in limiting executive prerogative); Jack Goldsmith, Power and Constraint: The Account-
able Presidency After 9/11 (2012).
173. A full exploration of the applicability of “internal separation of powers” to the Executive’s inter-
national law interpretation is outside the scope of this Article and will be examined in a separate project.
174. See supra note 171 at sources cited therein. A power-hungry and domineering President could
only exacerbate the effects I discuss here. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Legal Acrobatics, Illegal War, N.Y.
Times (June 21, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/21/opinion/21Ackerman.html?_r=0) (worry-
ing that Presidents might pick and choose among their advisers’ legal opinions).
175. See Ingber, supra note 109.
176. See id.
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set of actors on a matter that falls within their particular expertise or
mandate.
Proponents of a theory of internal executive constraints, sometimes iden-
tified as “internal separation of powers,”177 point to these various compo-
nents and actors as serving a checking function on executive authority. In
particular, scholars have hailed178 (and others have debated179) the efficacy of
OLC within the Department of Justice in reining in executive power. On
matters of international law, the State Department’s Office of the Legal Ad-
viser (“L”)—an office comprised almost entirely of civil servants who devote
their careers to international law180—serves as a forceful advocate for inter-
national law compliance within the executive branch, and as an intermediary
between domestic actors and the international sphere. Yet different types of
legal decisions trigger different processes for decision making and elevate
different deciders within the executive branch; in turn they may reach very
different legal conclusions.181 The task at hand may thus determine which
office takes the lead in determining the legal position, and the expertise and
traditions of particular executive offices may not always serve the checking
function expected of them.
For example, while the lawyers charged with international law compli-
ance are housed in L, OLC is charged primarily with interpreting matters of
domestic statutory and constitutional law and protecting the President’s do-
mestic authority.182 The two offices work together on many matters, but
their mandates, focuses, and expertise may at times bring them to different
conclusions, even when both offices are acting entirely in good faith. These
are just two of the many legal offices operating throughout the Executive.
When a matter implicates both domestic and international law concerns, the
mandates of these offices may overlap, but which office has the lead on a
matter of legal interpretation may have a significant influence on the Execu-
tive’s ultimate position.183
One problem with this dynamic that is relevant for our purposes here is
that when international law is used in the place of domestic legal authority,
the relevant expertise and the legal compliance norms for these different
bodies of law may be divided among different offices. The expertise or cul-
ture of legal compliance with respect to a particular norm may not align
perfectly with the office that holds the mandate in making a particular legal
interpretation. In more specific terms, an office generally steeped in domes-
177. See supra note 14 at sources cited therein.
178. See, e.g., Morrison, supra note 14.
179. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 14.
180. See Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, http://www.state.gov/s/l/ (last visited Dec. 1,
2015). The head of the office is normally a political appointee.
181. See Ingber, supra note 109.
182. See Morrison, supra note 14; Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, http://
www.justice.gov/olc/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2015).
183. See, e.g., Ingber, supra note 109.
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tic legal interpretation and norms—whether it be OLC or a litigating divi-
sion of the Justice Department—may end up holding the pen on a matter of
international law interpretation, yet may not have the same expertise, nego-
tiating background, or ingrained cultural norms of respect for the particu-
lars of the international law norm at issue.184 Particularly when that office
also sees its mandate as protecting executive authority whenever possible,
one can easily imagine it taking greater liberties with a flexible international
law interpretation than it might take with a similarly amorphous domestic
law norm.185 The same holds for the converse; in the event where an office
focused primarily on international law compliance holds sway on a matter of
domestic interpretation, it may be more willing to assert aggressive domes-
tic legal arguments in the service of international law compliance than
would an office focused solely on domestic matters.186
Internal checking mechanisms do exist and can be powerful constraints on
executive action. But there is no one-size-fits-all approach to the internal
separation of powers. It is necessary to examine the distinct processes, exper-
tise, and legal culture operating with respect to particular kinds of legal
decision making in order to assess the extent to which sufficient checks exist
to rein in particular exercises of executive authority.
***
I do not argue that the Executive is entirely unconstrained in its interpre-
tation of international law and its use of that law to determine the outer
bounds of its domestic authority. To the contrary—and for many reasons
including those discussed in the literature regarding the internal separation
of powers—the Executive is almost always likely to put forward at least a
straight-faced argument for compliance. This requirement itself, as well as
the process for formulating such an argument, serves significant con-
straining functions.187 Nor is the U.S. executive branch alone in seeking to
push the legal envelope to accord with its own interests; all states and repre-
sentatives of those states take positions on international law interpretation
184. Id.
185. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Obama Team Is Divided on Anti-terror Tactics, N.Y. Times (June 28, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/29/us/politics/29force.html.
186. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, 2 Top Lawyers Lost to Obama in Libya War Policy Debate, N.Y. Times, June
17, 2011, at A1 (discussing disagreement between the State Department Legal Adviser and OLC over the
applicability of the War Powers Resolution to the U.S. engagement in the conflict in Libya). According
to press reports, the State Department proposed a more flexible view than that of OLC on the President’s
domestic authorities to use force in Libya, in relation to the War Powers Act. Id.
187. See, e.g., Bradley & Morrison, supra note 149 (arguing that “the negative consequences to a
President of appearing to exceed the boundaries of what is plausible would be more severe than the
negative consequences of asserting a plausible but not ultimately persuasive view of the law” and that
even “[t]he relative perceived strength of a legal argument . . . might have a constraining effect”);
Richard Pildes, Law and the President, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1381 (2012) (reviewing Eric A. Posner &
Adrian Vermeule, The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic (2010) (connect-
ing the President’s perceived compliance with law to his credibility to the public)).
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that may diverge from the positions taken by others, and depending on their
particular domestic structures this may give the actors charged with formu-
lating those positions additional discretion within their domestic systems.188
I also do not argue here that the international law positions the Executive
has taken—including when those positions are extremely expansive—are
necessarily unreasonable interpretations of the United States’ obligations.
Rather, I argue that the potential for significant executive discretion in mat-
ters of international law interpretation should prompt scrutiny when that
interpretation interacts with a domestic constraint. Those charged with
checking executive authority—the courts, Congress, civil society, even in-
ternal executive officials—can either cabin or exacerbate that discretion de-
pending on how well those parties understand and are willing to scrutinize
the Executive’s international law positions and the interplay of these posi-
tions with domestic law.
C. International Law as Legitimizer of Executive Action
International law has long been used as a legitimizing force to bolster
support for a state or particular actor’s policy choices on the international
plane. As I demonstrate here, compliance with international law—or the
suggestion of compliance—is also used in the domestic sphere to bolster sup-
port for an actor’s domestic legal position.189
The force of international law as a legitimizer lies largely in its signaling
of factors that provide reassurance to critics of executive power. These in-
clude the suggestion of external acquiescence in the President’s actions; the
checking function of international law and institutions, which may be par-
ticularly valuable in areas where there is little domestic oversight; and the
presumption that international law itself provides a layer of constraint on
the Executive’s authority.190 At times, however, these signals may be over-
stated. Moreover, international law can be misappropriated—both inten-
tionally and unintentionally—to justify the empowerment mechanism
through reliance upon these legitimizing effects even when the correspond-
188. Anthea Roberts’s work on comparative international law suggests that states may take very
different and in fact somewhat parochial views on what international law entails. See Anthea Roberts,
Is International Law International? (forthcoming 2015); see also Ashley Deeks, Domestic Humanitarian
Law: Developing the Law of War in Domestic Courts, in Applying International Humanitarian Law in
Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Bodies: International and Domestic Aspects (D. Jinks et al. eds.,
2014); Chayes & Chayes, supra note 150 (asserting that treaty parties may even “take advantage of the
indeterminacy of treaty language to justify indulging their preferred course of action”).
189. Cf. Galbraith, International law, supra note 17, at 998–1000 (arguing that international law can
provide “extra-constitutional legitimacy” but that international law’s role as a legitimizing force has
declined in recent years).
190. See, e.g., Katerina Linos, The Democratic Foundations of Policy Diffusion: How
Health, Family, and Employment Laws Spread Across Countries 2 (2013) (arguing that politi-
cians rely on international norms to “signal that their decisions are competent and mainstream”); see also
supra Part I.F. (discussing the use of international law embodied in United Nations Security Council
Resolutions to signal international acquiescence in the President’s course of action in Libya).
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ing presumed checks do not operate or are not sufficient. This may occur
through overstating the acquiescence of others in a particular course of ac-
tion; through exaggerating a constraint to provide a sense of security to
critics in permitting looser domestic requirements; or through the invoca-
tion of international law rhetoric as a smokescreen to obscure the true under-
lying legal argument or its effect.191 The dual nature of international law’s
use as a legitimizer of action makes it all the more important that executive
power-watchers remain engaged in international law substance and attuned
to the nuances of international law argumentation in the domestic realm.
1. International Law Compliance as Assumed Constraint
International law is sometimes used effectively to provide critical domes-
tic checks, particularly in areas where the domestic law constraints are diffi-
cult to determine, or where the Executive operates without significant
domestic oversight or claims significant domestic legal discretion. In such
areas, imposing international law constraints may be the only means of pro-
viding at least some outer bounds to the Executive’s authority. An example
is the Hamdi Court’s broad reading of the President’s statutory authority to
permit the wartime detention of a U.S. citizen on U.S. soil.192 The Court did
not interpret that authority as limitless. Instead it relied upon the con-
straints in international law to soften and delimit an otherwise broad hold-
ing. It held that Hamdi could be detained only because it was lawful to
detain him under the laws of war, and that he could be detained only for
such time as the laws of war would permit. Were it not for the assumption
of international law constraints on the Executive’s actions in that case, it is
unlikely the Court would have upheld such expansive domestic authority.193
Yet for reasons discussed above in Section A, international law does not
always provide the limiting principle expected of it. In permitting detention
of “enemy combatants,” the Hamdi Court appeared to contemplate a fairly
narrow definition of that term, envisioning fighters who had actually partic-
ipated in the conflict in Afghanistan against the United States.194 In litigat-
ing the many detainee cases that followed Hamdi, however, the Executive
proposed a much broader and more fluid conception of the class of individu-
191. For a discussion of particularly egregious examples of the reliance on rhetoric regarding the
legality of actions under international law see Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 171, at 167–69 (dis-
cussing, inter alia, Hitler’s reliance on international law justifications for occupation and invasions of
other states).
192. See supra Part I.C.1.
193. See supra Part I.B. The Court was explicit about this approach in Medellı́n; in distinguishing the
claims settlement line of cases, the Court stated that its security in granting the executive significant
discretion in those cases lay in part on the limitations imposed by the international agreements them-
selves. Medellı́n v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 530–31 (2008).
194. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516 (2004) (noting debate over the scope of the term, and
narrowing its ruling to persons falling under the government’s description of Hamdi himself: “an indi-
vidual who, it alleges, was ‘part of or supporting forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners’
in Afghanistan and who ‘engaged in an armed conflict against the United States’ there”).
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als subject to its detention authority. In making its case, particularly in the
wake of Boumediene, the government successfully relied upon a standard for
detention it proposed as derived from, and presumably cabined by, interna-
tional law.195 Yet with few exceptions, the courts have shown almost no
interest in dissecting the international law theory behind the Executive’s
legal definition of whom it may detain. Despite years of litigation scrutiniz-
ing the government’s detention regime, the courts have generally left the
interpretation of the parameters of this authority almost entirely to the
executive.196
I suggest that since the days of Hamdi and Boumediene, courts have shown
a willingness to defer to the Executive’s position in large part because the
executive has, in recent years, gone to great lengths to insist on compliance
with international law, in contrast to early positions by the prior Adminis-
tration.197 Yet despite its explicit insistence on compliance with interna-
tional law in these cases in recent years, the Executive has nevertheless
promoted a quite flexible, expansive, and in fact hotly contested view of the
international law defining its authority to detain in armed conflict.198
In particular, there are two core components of the Executive’s detention
authority theory that suggest it diverges sharply from consensus views of
international law: 1) the extension of that authority beyond “military wing”
members of Al Qaeda or Taliban armed forces to nonfighter “members” or
even mere “supporters” of those groups, and 2) the constellation of facts
sufficient to support these legal classifications.199 Despite its assurance that
this is a cabined detention authority, “informed by” international law,200
the Executive’s position that its authority to detain as “enemy combat-
195. I say “presumably” because the Executive’s position here gives the impression that it is intended
to be cabined by international law, but it is not in fact explicit on this point. U.S. briefs simply state that
the government’s definition is “informed by principles of the laws of war.” March 13 Brief, supra note
10, at 1. In fact, when pressed in oral argument, lawyers for the government avoided pinning down the
government’s position on the extent to which the President’s AUMF authority is limited by international
law. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument, al Warafi v. Obama 716 F.3d 627 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (No. 11-
5276).
196. While the district courts made early attempts to assess the government’s detention standard
against the AUMF and international law, appellate decisions later diluted the courts’ review in favor of
an extraordinarily deferential standard. Compare, e.g., Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43 (D.D.C.
2009) (accepting much of the government’s proposed detention standard but holding that the AUMF
authorized the President to detain persons who substantially supported Taliban or Al Qaeda forces only
to the extent such support amounted to membership in those forces) with Latif v. Obama, 677 F.3d 1175
(D.C. Cir. 2012) (Tatel, J., dissenting) (arguing that “it is hard to see what is left of the Supreme Court’s
command in Boumediene that habeas review be “meaningful”).
197. Compare, e.g., Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority
Relative to Detainees Held at Guantánamo Bay, In re Guantánamo Bay Detainee Litigation, (D.D.C.
Mar. 13, 2009) (Misc. No. 08-442) (TFH), with Memorandum from the President, Humane Treatment of al
Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002), http://www.pegc.us/archive/White_House/
bush_memo_20020207_ed.pdf (asserting that “none of the provisions of Geneva apply to [the] conflict
with al Qaeda”).
198. See supra Part II.B.2.
199. See Ingber, supra note 17.
200. See March 13 Brief, supra note 10; see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 507 (2004).
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ants”201 nonfighting “members” of particular organizations as well as “sub-
stantial supporters” of these groups—by which it has included financiers,202
propagandists,203 those providing logistical and administrative support,204
those who took up military training but ultimately only served as medics,205
and even those simply found in the vicinity of other fighters206—is in fact
extremely controversial as a matter of international law. More than contro-
versial, this position cannot be found in any treaty, nor in any modern
source on customary international law; nor is it a position shared—at least
not openly—by any ally.207 Yet this position has received significant defer-
ence and ultimately endorsement by the courts; to date the Executive’s legal
theory has afforded the Executive considerable flexibility and broad author-
ity to detain virtually the entire population of individuals who have come
before U.S. domestic courts with habeas petitions to challenge their law-of-
war detention.208 Whatever one’s view of the merits of this substantive stan-
dard, there is little in the Hamdi decision to suggest that the Supreme Court
thought it was endorsing this broad a detention standard at that time. To
the contrary, the Court declared that its “understanding” of the AUMF to
include detention authority “may unravel” should the circumstances cease
to look like traditional “conflicts that informed the development of the law
201. I refer here to detention authority for individuals held specifically as “enemy combatants” and
not under other theories, such as criminal detention or law of war detention for civilian threats to secur-
ity. While the government dropped the use of the term “enemy combatant” in March 2009 in the
context of the Guantánamo habeas litigation, this change was largely symbolic; the government’s inter-
national law theory remains one based on combatant detention. See, e.g., Rebecca Ingber & Nathalie
Weizmann, Whatever Happened to Umm Sayyaf? Lawfare (June 11, 2015, 8:10 AM), http://
www.lawfareblog.com/whatever-happened-umm-sayyaf (explaining the government’s theory for deten-
tion by analogy to state combatants); see also Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507 (extending detention authority under
the AUMF under a theory that international law permits detention in armed conflict of enemy
combatants).
202. Sliti v. Bush, 592 F. Supp. 2d 46. (D.D.C. 2008).
203. United States v. al Bahlul, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1159 (USCMCR 2011) vacated in part, No.
11-1324, 2013 WL 297726 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 25, 2013), reh’g en banc granted, order vacated (Apr. 23, 2013)
on reh’g en banc, 767 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014) and aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded, 767 F.3d 1 (D.C.
Cir. 2014) and vacated in part, 792 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (reviewing a conviction under a military
commission—whose jurisdiction was limited to trying “unlawful enemy combatants”—for material sup-
port and conspiracy on the basis of defendant’s role in “al Qaeda’s media office and later as [Bin Laden’s]
personal assistant/secretary for public relations”).
204. Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
205. Al Warafi v. Obama, 704 F. Supp. 2d 32 (D.D.C. Mar. 24, 2010).
206. Ali v. Obama, 736 F.3d 542 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Uthman v. Obama, 637 F.3d 400 (D.C. Cir.
2011).
207. See, e.g., 2001 Canadian Manual, supra note 164 (defining “combatant”—lawful and unlaw-
ful—to “include[ ] any member of the armed forces, except medical and religious personnel” as well as
“[c]ivilians who take a direct part in hostilities”); U.K. Manual, supra 164 (employing a similar defini-
tion); Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities
Under International Humanitarian Law (July 1, 2009), https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc-002-
0990.pdf.
208. See, e.g., Almerfedi v. Obama, 654 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (upholding the government’s deten-
tion authority—and overturning a district court grant of habeas—on the basis of very thin and circum-
stantial evidence).
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of war.”209 The government’s stated reliance on international law standards
in these cases—and the Court’s reliance on its international law limits in
ratifying the President’s expansive authority under the AUMF—surely sug-
gest to potential critics a more constraining set of limitations than the Exec-
utive has ultimately adopted.
Reliance on international law as the constraining force in certain areas can
decrease pressure on existing or potential domestic law constraints that
might otherwise do more work. The Hamdi Court, in relying on interna-
tional law constraints, did not seek a different limiting principle for the
President’s detention authority. Furthermore, cases following Hamdi have
relied upon international law to form the standard for detention authority
rather than apply pressure on Congress to craft its own standard.210 Argua-
bly it is partly for this reason that there has been virtually no grappling with
the substantive standard for detention outside of the executive branch, nor
has there been a real exploration of the domestic rights that should apply to
such detainees, whether citizens or not.211
Concerns about this standard go beyond Guantánamo detention. Despite
the government’s insistence in early briefing that its Guantánamo theory
was restricted to detention alone, the jurisprudence that has developed in
those cases forms the core precedent for determining the legal category of
enemy combatant for the government’s targeting authority.212 Perhaps the
most significant legal constraint the OLC memoranda place on the govern-
ment’s ability to target and kill American citizens is the requirement that
the target be a member of enemy armed forces engaged in an armed conflict
against the United States.213 The Guantánamo litigation precedent tells us
that the bar for meeting that standard may be very low indeed.
2. International Law Compliance Arguments Mollify the Usual Critics of
Executive Authority
There is another powerful but counterintuitive reason that international
law can have a significant legitimizing force in contemporary debates: the
substantial overlap between the community of actors who often critique
strong claims of executive authority—within the courts, Congress, and civil
society at large—and those actors engaged in efforts to preserve a strong role
for international law constraints in the domestic system. When these man-
209. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521.
210. Congress ultimately simply affirmed the detention standard the courts had been employing in
the Guantánamo litigation, without providing clarification. See NDAA 2012, supra note 54.
211. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (extending habeas to military detainees at
Guantánamo without clarifying the substantive norms that would apply).
212. See, e.g., July 2010 OLC Memorandum, supra note 1, at 21–22 nn.28–29 and accompanying text
(citing U.S. briefs and judicial opinions in the Guantánamo habeas litigation for the purposes of deter-
mining the “individuals against whom Congress has authorized the use of necessary and appropriate
force”).
213. See supra Part I.C.2.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\57-1\HLI105.txt unknown Seq: 51 12-APR-16 10:15
2016 / International Law Constraints as Executive Power 99
dates overlap, the usual critics of executive authority may be inclined to find
executive claims of authority that rest on assertions of international law
compliance more persuasive. The frequent coincidence of these two objec-
tives—executive oversight and international law compliance—may obscure
for these critics the potential for executive aggrandizement by reference to
international law.214
This paradox is exacerbated today by ongoing debate surrounding the role
of international law in the U.S. domestic system, and the perspective shared
by many that international law has in recent years come under attack in the
United States.215 It is also due in part to the perception in recent years of the
Executive—in particular the Bush Administration—as willfully dismissing
international law as a constraint on the President’s authority, and of its
grisly reasons for doing so, such as the mistreatment of military detainees
under its control.216 This narrative and history promote a somewhat skewed
perspective on the substance of international law writ large, one that is
viewed predominantly through the lens of individual rights advocacy. The
prominence of these activities promotes certain assumptions about interna-
tional law—that it is particularly rights-protective and at times more so
than even U.S. domestic law—which imbue international law with a sense
of legitimacy and protectiveness where individual rights or power imbal-
ances are at stake. As discussed above, these assumptions do not always bear
out.
The frequent overlay between the outspoken critics of executive power
and those communities working to promote the role of international human
rights norms in domestic courts helps foster this perception. These constitu-
encies may be particularly inclined to view more leniently executive posi-
tions that purport to comply with international law. Take, for example, the
litigation position of the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) in
Hamdi.217 The civil rights organization did not argue, as Justice Scalia ulti-
mately asserted in his dissent, that as a U.S. citizen Hamdi must be charged
with a crime or released. Instead it accepted the view that such individuals
could be held as “enemy combatants”—a term it did not define—as long as
their detention satisfied the treatment criteria of the Geneva Conventions.218
That entailed neglecting critical matters of process, as well as criteria for
determining who could be detained, both core dimensions of domestic law
protections.
214. Cf. Galbraith, supra note 17 (proposing a restoration of the international law limits that accom-
panied the Executive’s aggrandizement vis-à-vis Congress).
215. See supra Part I.A.
216. See, e.g., Office of Legal Counsel, Memorandum for Alberto Gonzales Re: Application of Treaties
and Laws to Al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees, Jan. 22, 2002.
217. ACLU Amicus Brief, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (No. 02-7338), 2002 WL
33962810 (accepting the long-term detention of citizens as “enemy combatants” if held as Prisoners of
War).
218. Id. at 27–29.
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The ACLU position may have been the result of a simple political calcula-
tion regarding what was possible. Critics of executive overreach rightly look
to all sources of legal constraint to check otherwise unbridled authority; at
times, particularly when domestic sources are unclear or domestic oversight
is inoperative, they may view the imposition of international law constraints
alone as a better result than a completely law-free zone. Yet the existence of
such constraints may sometimes neutralize the fight for the imposition of
and compliance with other domestic legal constraints.
3. International Law Arguments as Smokescreen
Another danger in using international law to determine the outer bounds
of domestic executive authority is that a lack of engagement with or under-
standing of international law by potential critics or oversight bodies can
have the effect—either intentional or not—of obscuring the Executive’s le-
gal argument.
Arguments sounding in international law are sometimes employed in
ways that conceal the Executive’s true legal position. The Executive invokes
norms drawn from international law that may resonate with or sound similar
to domestic law doctrines, but in fact have entirely different sources, stan-
dards, and purposes.219 The Department of Justice’s conflation of its jus ad
bellum imminence theory with the kind of imminent danger contemplated in
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, discussed above, is one example. Another
form of obfuscation is the conflation—by the Executive220 and by
courts221—of what actions the President may lawfully undertake in wartime
as a matter of domestic law with what actions the United States may lawfully
undertake as a matter of international law. If the Court and others concerned
with executive authority do not remain attuned to the substance of the in-
ternational law that replaces the domestic constraints, reliance on interna-
tional law as a sole constraint in areas where the Executive asserts aggressive
and flexible interpretations can provide a mere veneer of protection with
little real constraint.
Obfuscation can occur with or without the full intent of the party employ-
ing the technique, and it is exacerbated by the frequently divided nature of
international and domestic law expertise. This does not require bad faith.
The potential for such occurrence is clearer when one contemplates the dis-
219. This is similar to what Shirin Sinnar calls a “rule of law trope—a legal term of art borrowed
from constitutional law to persuade law-conscious audiences that the executive was sufficiently con-
strained.” Shirin Sinnar, Rule of Law Tropes in National Security, 129 Harv. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2016).
220. See, e.g., DOJ White Paper, supra note 67, at 1–3 (explaining the President’s authority as relying
upon, inter alia, “the inherent right of the United States to national self-defense under international law”)
(emphasis added).
221. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 507 (2004) (drawing on international law’s acceptance of
detention in war to incorporate detention authorization into Congress’s grant of authority to the Presi-
dent to use force).
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aggregated nature of executive decision making.222 In particular, when ad-
dressing a thorny, mixed matter of international and domestic law, it may
be complicated to determine which office has the appropriate mandate or
expertise. Acquiescence in a particular approach by a key set of actors may
be erroneously presumed.223 Similarly, the courts and Congress often assume
that executive positions are the result of particular expertise and the work of
a given set of actors. Yet in reality those particular experts may not always
be the actual drivers of a policy or legal position. 224
This combination of disaggregated decision making, on the one hand, and
congressional and judicial assumptions of executive expertise and compe-
tence, on the other, at times obscures some of the Executive’s current war-
time legal positions. Consider for example the Executive’s position on the
scope of the “associated forces” it asserts fall within its authority to use force
under the AUMF.225 The Executive invokes what it calls “the well-estab-
lished concept of co-belligerency in the [international] law of war” for the
purpose of defending its interpretation of its domestic statutory authority.226 I
theorize that the Executive relies upon “co-belligerency” for two related
functions: 1) as a means of legitimizing its claim to expansive domestic
authority by asserting it has a basis in some exogenous, pedigreed legal con-
cept; and 2) as a pledge that the interpretation has reasonable limits—by
promising that the claimed authority is not “open-ended” but rather
steeped in this “well-established” international norm.227
In order for “co-belligerency” to provide these legitimizing and checking
functions, however, the term must in fact invoke a clearly defined and well-
accepted standard for determining how an entity—in this context a nonstate
armed group—becomes a “co-belligerent,” or what threshold it must meet
before it should properly fall within the AUMF. Yet as a matter of interna-
tional law, the term “co-belligerency” itself does not provide this content.228
And as I explore in another work, the standard that scholars have proposed
for determining when such a group becomes a co-belligerent of Al Qaeda—
and which two presidential administrations have to some degree seemed to
accept229—is the wrong international law test for the domestic law purpose
222. See supra notes 175–181 and accompanying text.
223. See id.
224. See id.
225. See supra notes 54–59 at sources cited therein.
226. Jeh Johnson, supra note 56 (“[T]he concept of an ‘associated force’ [is not] an open-ended one, as
some suggest. . . . [Rather,] it is based on the well-established concept of co-belligerency in the law of
war.”).
227. See Ingber, supra note 57.
228. See, e.g., id.; Morris Greenspan, The Modern Law of Land Warfare 531 (1959) (defining
the term “co-belligerent” as simply a “belligerent fighting in association with one or more belligerent
powers”).
229. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terror-
ism, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2047 (2005) (looking to neutrality law for guidance in crafting a co-belligerency
standard for determining the groups appropriately covered under the AUMF.) U.S. briefs relying on the
co-belligerency concept cite this article. See, e.g., Brief for Respondents-Appellees at *42 n.10, Khan v.
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asserted here.230 However, it is a test that permits the Executive significant
flexibility in interpreting the AUMF broadly to authorize force against
groups providing a certain degree of support to Al Qaeda, even if such
groups have not themselves directly attacked the United States.
A cynical view of executive authority might hold that the use of an inapt
international law test to suggest real constraints in an effort to expand au-
thority is an intentional obfuscation by executive officials. Yet there is often
more going on beneath the surface, as I explore in that piece.231 One likely
villain in such cases is the simple messiness of bureaucratic decision making,
the differentiation of expertise, interests, and biases throughout the Execu-
tive, and the stickiness of legal positions once taken. 232 Moreover the cyni-
cal view does not explain the concept’s acceptance by courts and Congress
with virtually no scrutiny of its underpinnings, despite their keen interest in
the substantive issues regarding the scope of the President’s AUMF author-
ity.233 This example alone underscores the need for those charged with exec-
utive oversight in the domestic realm to remain attentive to international
law content and its invocation for the purpose of understanding domestic
law.
III. Implications of the Empowerment Phenomenon
The primary contributions of this Article lie first, in reconceptualizing
the interplay between international law and the U.S. domestic system to
examine the invocation of international law not just in constraining but in
enabling domestic power; and second, in parsing the particular dangers in
this phenomenon that have gone virtually unexplored. This Article now
turns briefly to potential remedies.
There are a number of ways to grapple with the concerns identified in this
Article. The deepest solution to these concerns lies primarily in a renewed
substantive engagement—by all those charged with checking executive au-
thority—with both the substance of international law and its interplay with
the domestic system. This would permit recognition of the empowerment
Obama, (D.C. Cir. 2011) (No. 10-5306). We cannot know for certain that the Obama Administration
relies upon this substantive standard internally, as its briefs may continue to cite the article or reference
neutrality law simply because prior courts have accepted the argument. But the Executive’s statements
and practice suggest that it is relying on a substantive standard for its “associated forces” theory that
accepts some level of support falling short of direct hostilities as bringing third parties into the conflict.
230. See Ingber, supra note 57 (arguing that the neutrality-derived test is the wrong standard for
interpreting the groups governed by the AUMF because it is not a test for determining the existing
parties to the conflict; rather it is derived from somewhat archaic international law rules governing when
a state—as a whole—may lawfully choose to respond with force to another state’s actions). This paper
explores how such a concept takes root within the executive branch and ultimately becomes entrenched
law. Id.
231. Id.
232. See Ingber, supra note 109.
233. See, e.g., supra note 59.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\57-1\HLI105.txt unknown Seq: 55 12-APR-16 10:15
2016 / International Law Constraints as Executive Power 103
phenomenon when it occurs, and a deep understanding of the ways interna-
tional law is invoked to enhance as well as to constrain executive authority.
Ideally such recognition could lead to a nuanced exchange between the Ex-
ecutive and critics of executive power over the appropriate scope of executive
authority in accordance with both domestic and international law.
Comprehensive substantive engagement by all parties is an idealistic solu-
tion. I thus propose a more granular means of effecting greater substantive
engagement and holding the Executive to account for its legal positions.
This is a three-part solution and entails first placing a burden on the Execu-
tive to demonstrate legitimate reasons for invoking international law to en-
hance its authority. I then suggest a rethinking of the considerations
relevant to judicial deference and congressional acquiescence, which must
account for the dangers identified in this Article. And finally, because there
will always be areas where the Executive acts out of view of courts and
Congress, internal institutional checks are critical to reining in executive
power. In these areas, the empowerment phenomenon prompts consideration
of the efficacy of the “internal separation of powers” in advancing interna-
tional law compliance and checking executive authority.234
A. An Executive Burden in Invoking International Law Empowerment
There is a tension inherent in the concerns identified in this Article.
There are substantial and legitimate reasons that our domestic structure
turns to international law in certain areas as the substantive rule of decision,
particularly where the matter primarily involves the regulation of our rela-
tionship to other states. At times international law provides the only effec-
tive legal limits on state action. At times compliance with international law
on the international plane may require some disruption to the ordinary do-
mestic order. Certainly international law constraints operate effectively
alongside and in addition to domestic ones. But occasionally international
law is invoked instead as shorthand in lieu of grappling with the appropriate
outer bounds of domestic executive power. As demonstrated, this phenome-
non can have grave results for the domestic separation of powers, individual
rights, and the rule of law more broadly. An executive burden to explain in
detail the authority it claims, in particular its understanding of its authori-
ties and limitations under both domestic and international law, would go a
long way toward neutralizing these dangers.
Whether international law empowerment is ultimately appropriate in any
given case will depend on a weighing of several critical factors, which the
Executive’s consideration of its legal position should address. The first factor
is the extent to which the matter at hand is primarily outward-looking or
inward-focused. International law provides the only common (or potentially
234. This section touches on matters that will be the subject of future work on the influence of the
“internal separation of powers” on the Executive’s international law interpretation.
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common235) rule of decision for state-to-state interaction. Moreover, the
checking and enforcement mechanisms of international law, and the motiva-
tion of reciprocity, operate most effectively on actions that directly affect
other states and international institutions, thus providing some limits on
the asserted power. Examples include obligations to provide consular rights
to foreign nationals under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, or
immunity from suit for foreign states and officials. The checking functions
of international law are least effective in areas primarily implicating the
state’s internal affairs, such as the allocation of power between the branches
or—with the possible exception of human rights law—the relationship be-
tween the state and its subjects.
Another factor is the extent to which the international law in question is
actually intended to act as a constraint and is sufficiently developed to pro-
vide a clear set of rules that lend themselves to easily verifiable compliance.
Scholars often rely upon international law as a useful limiting principle, for
example where the Executive’s domestic authority is not clear or otherwise
fails to provide sufficient limits.236 But because the objective in such cases is
a clear constraint on executive action, the invocation of international law as
limiting principle will be most useful—and most consistent with the funda-
mental constitutional principle that the Presidency is an office of limited
powers—in areas where it provides clearly ascertainable rules that constrain
state action, such as the strict provisions of the Geneva Conventions gov-
erning battlefield detention of Prisoners of War.
In other areas, however, where international law is ambiguous or in a state
of flux—such as capture of nonstate actors far from the battlefield and de-
tention under a law-of-war framework—it provides a less clear or verifiable
limiting principle. The Executive typically does not flagrantly violate the
law but rather at least professes compliance based on an interpretation that
may be controversial. The extent to which that interpretation is within a
margin of appreciation or, instead, truly beyond the pale is an exceedingly
difficult determination, particularly in areas where the law is evolving and
the United States itself may seek to advance a particular view. The use of
international law as a sole limiting principle should thus take account of the
extent to which that international law rule provides a genuine constraint.
A third factor is the extent to which the international law principle is
invoked for a traditional use—both as a matter of the domestic empower-
ment and the substantive international law norm itself. Longstanding do-
mestic reliance on established international law principles as the rule of
decision in the domestic realm may suggest that these principles have over
time become a part of our domestic structure, and also suggests acquiescence
by the other branches in the Executive’s reliance on these principles. The
235. Cf. Roberts, supra note 188.
236. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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historical use of sovereign immunity doctrine to displace legal claims is a
good example of this.237 By contrast, the more novel the decision to turn to
international law in a particular area, and the more creative the substantive
international law theory, the more such an approach merits close scrutiny.
In light of the foregoing, consider two examples drawn from Part I: mili-
tary detention and targeted killing. Whether the Executive’s burden is met
in any given example depends on its particular use in that case. Consider
first the case of Yaser Esam Hamdi, a U.S. citizen detained without criminal
charge or trial and held as an enemy combatant. As discussed above, the
Hamdi Court invoked international law to justify a broad reading of a use of
force statute, not for the purpose of compliance with international law but
for the purpose of enhancing executive power. In doing so, however, the
Hamdi Court looked to a longstanding tradition of permitting military de-
tention of fighters found within the active battlefield in a state-to-state
armed conflict and likewise pointed to clear limits in international law gov-
erning the outer bounds of such detention. Compared to traditional battle-
field detention, Hamdi’s circumstances—his U.S. citizenship, the fact that
he was held on U.S. soil far from the conflict, and the government’s determi-
nation to hold him outside of a clear Geneva framework (and with no clear
end of the conflict in sight)—are more novel, inward-facing and less clearly
defined by international law rules. The Executive could likely meet its bur-
den in such a case, but it is a close call.238 And if the Hamdi case is on the
line, any significant extension of the Hamdi reasoning—either to contexts
beyond its traditional use or to international law theories whose outer limits
are not clearly defined—should raise red flags.239
The Executive’s position on the legality of targeted killing of al-Awl-
aki—illuminated primarily through the redacted Department of Justice
OLC memoranda—does not currently meet this burden. In justifying the
use of force against al-Awlaki, the Executive has stretched the traditional
understanding both of the substantive international law and of its invocation
to enhance domestic power. The Executive’s international law position on
whom it may lawfully target in the conflict with Al Qaeda is both contro-
versial in its breadth, and completely unclear on its limits. Throughout
much of the decade and a half of this conflict we have not known where the
Executive believes it has authority to use force, against which groups, nor
against whom within those groups. While the Executive may point to judicial
precedent for the use of international law to narrow ordinary due process
principles in the areas of detention and even trial and execution,240 in cases
237. In fact, as evidence of this, Congress ultimately did codify the Executive’s international law
position in the FSIA. FSIA, supra note 23.
238. Justices Souter and Ginsburg would have insisted that the Government’s detention authority
turn on the extent to which its detention policies complied with the laws of war. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
542 U.S. 507, 549–51 (2004).
239. The Hamdi plurality itself suggested this. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
240. See, e.g., Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507; Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
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in which there has previously been at least some judicial scrutiny, it can point
to no precedent for using the empowerment phenomenon to permit the
long-term tracking and premeditated targeted killing without trial of an
American citizen, at home or abroad. It may be that the Executive could
meet its burden to demonstrate that international law empowerment is ap-
propriate in this case. But it has much work to do in explaining first, why a
resort to international law is appropriate here to defining the contours of
each of these domestic law authorities and prohibitions; and second, exactly
how, as a granular matter, it views international law as limiting the Execu-
tive’s authority in the critical areas—such as the classification of enemy
combatant—where its international law theory is the core constraint.
B. Rethinking Deference to Executive Interpretations of International Law
The empowerment phenomenon described in this Article should prompt
a rethinking of not only when international law might be properly invoked
to empower domestic authority, but also who is best suited to interpret the
substantive content of that law. The courts’ and Congress’s level of deference
and acquiescence to the Executive on the interpretation of international law
must take into consideration the extent to which that international law is
invoked to determine the outer contours of domestic legal authority.
As with the factors discussed above regarding the use of the empower-
ment phenomenon itself, there are good reasons to permit the Executive
discretion in determining the U.S. position on international law and matters
affecting foreign policy. These reasons include the desire that the state speak
clearly “with one voice” to the international community on its international
law positions and that the state through executive action be able to move
international custom.241 The Executive may also have specialized expertise as
the drafter and implementer of the particular international treaty or norm at
issue.242 And questions of international interpretation are often intermingled
with questions of foreign policy on which the judiciary rightly defers to the
political branches,243 such as recognition of foreign governments244 or
whether to treat acts of violence against the state as an act of war. Erring too
heavily against executive discretion could leave the Executive with insuffi-
cient room to maneuver on the international plane. Yet the tensions between
permitting executive discretion on the international plane and reining in
executive authority in the domestic sphere collide where international law is
used to determine the outer limits of domestic authority.
241. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 112 cmt. c (1987).
242. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 141.
243. Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 415 (2003); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain 542 U.S. 692,
727 (2004) (courts should be “wary of impinging on the discretion of the Legislative and Executive
Branches in managing foreign affairs.”).
244. In Zivotofsky v. Kerry, the Court recently held that the President has exclusive power over recog-
nition of foreign governments. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II), 135 S. Ct. 2076
(2015).
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Similar factors thus guide this inquiry. First, the inward-outward distinc-
tion is also significant for matters of deference. Fundamental separation-of-
powers principles suggest that deference to executive interpretation is often
appropriate on matters that primarily implicate foreign policy. Yet these
same principles do not and should not entrust the Executive with interpre-
tive control over matters implicating primarily domestic legal concerns such
as separation of powers and individual rights.245 In fact, one of the very
justifications for retaining executive discretion over international law inter-
pretation on the international plane—the argument that the President
should be able to move international custom by, in effect, violating interna-
tional law—should raise alarm when that discretion is employed on the do-
mestic plane to override domestic law. The deference trigger should
therefore be weakest when international law provides the rule of decision
with respect to a domestic constraint or norm addressing core domestic mat-
ters of individual rights or separation of powers.
A second factor is the extent to which executive discretion entails control
over the parameters of its own domestic authority. For the reasons explained,
it is appropriate that courts defer to the Executive on matters of foreign
policy. But when the legal question at stake is the scope of the executive
branch’s own legal authority, courts should hesitate before deferring to the
Executive’s interpretation.246 Deference should be weakest when the Execu-
tive relies on international law for the purpose of expanding authority or
evading a statutory or constitutional prohibition, as these areas provide the
greatest incentive to aggrandize authority.247 By contrast, there should be
less concern where the underlying goal is compliance with international law
as there is less reason to fear the Executive will employ international law
interpretation for the purpose of aggrandizing his own authority.
Third is the extent to which the matter at hand is primarily a question of
policy or of law. Deference to the political branches on matters of foreign
policy need not extend entirely to matters of international law interpreta-
tion, though often these are difficult to differentiate. Deference to the Exec-
utive on whether a foreign state merits immunity, for example, may include
both a political act of recognition as well as a legal determination regarding
the extent to which the act in question merits immunity.248 The Executive
merits deference on the policy question of recognition, but courts have the
institutional competence necessary to address the legal components of the
245. This is without prejudice to areas where the President may receive deference to his interpreta-
tions over delegated statutory authority. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
246. Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws 151–52, (Thomas Nugent trans., 1949) (1748) (“When
the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates,
there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact
tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner.”).
247. See, e.g., Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116 Yale L.J.
1230 (2007).
248. See, e.g., supra Part I.C.3. (discussing foreign official immunity).
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question, such as the extent to which an act qualifies as a commercial activ-
ity sufficient to engage that immunity exception.
C. Inter-branch Engagement over Empowerment
Judicial deference is not the only relevant factor. Courts and Congress
should both be increasingly inclined to step in the more the empowerment
phenomenon leaves the Executive responsible for interpreting inward-facing
as opposed to outward-looking authority, the more the matter at hand ad-
dresses individual rights versus foreign policy—in short the more it involves
a matter of the parameters of the President’s domestic power. All of this
requires vigilance by courts and Congress over the way international law is
being employed and over the content of that law.
Proposing increased congressional engagement is not simple rhetoric or
fantasy. History—even recent history—provides many useful examples
where Congress has stepped in to craft a domestic legal framework when the
prior regime of executive discretion under the empowerment phenomenon
was considered ineffective, insufficient, or inappropriate. At times Congress
has acted entirely of its own accord to engage the Executive’s attempt at
empowerment, and at other times it has acted after judicial intervention has
already invalidated executive action. Relevant examples discussed in this Ar-
ticle include: the Neutrality Act of 1794, enacted to bolster Washington’s
unilateral attempt to impose a position of strict neutrality on the country;
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, enacted in part to codify the Execu-
tive’s international law theory of immunity; and the Military Commissions
Act of 2006, enacted to permit the President to try violations of the interna-
tional laws of war after the Supreme Court in Hamdan struck down the
President’s unilateral establishment of military commissions.249
These are, of course, examples of congressional action primarily intended
to enable rather than to constrain executive action. Yet the very act of legislat-
ing entails a grappling with and choosing the appropriate domestic rules; it
also codifies clear limits and it clarifies for public consumption—and poten-
tial critique—the breadth and limits of the authority granted to the
Executive.250
D. Institutional Design as a Check on Empowerment
While it is important that the courts and Congress engage with interna-
tional law in these areas as they would with domestic law, they do not realis-
tically provide a complete solution to the problems explored in this Article.
249. See, e.g., Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006); FSIA,
supra note 23; Neutrality Proclamation, supra note 111.
250. See, e.g., the Military Commissions Act, supra note 249, which authorized the President to try
enemy combatants in military commissions after Hamdan had struck down his attempt to do so unilater-
ally, but also created clear rules for how such commissions must be undertaken.
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The internal process and institutional design of internal executive decision
making over matters of international law interpretation must provide genu-
ine internal supplements to these external checks.
In fact, internal checks can at times be more constraining than external
oversight mechanisms. Consigning control over international law interpreta-
tion to the courts and Congress does not necessarily mean more constraining
or less controversial international law interpretations. To the extent these
institutions have taken up knotty matters of international law in recent
years, many of the outcomes have been roundly criticized by international
law practitioners and scholars.251 Additionally, judicial involvement without
real teeth can have a significant if inadvertent effect on intra-executive pro-
cess without providing meaningful review.252 If courts intervene in a matter
but leave some residual kernel to the Executive—for example, the standard
for determining that an individual is an enemy combatant—that kernel has
the potential to swallow the whole enterprise.253 Moreover, the simple exis-
tence of judicial review alone can have unintended, negative consequences
on executive decision making, like abdication of responsibility by executive
officials or the reshuffling of decision-making authority within the execu-
tive, for example by taking decisions out of the hands of experts or policy-
makers and placing them instead in the hands of litigators.254 Finally, there
are a number of critical areas where the Executive acts unilaterally, even
secretly, and due to some mix of judicial and congressional abdication or
ignorance there is little to no room for intervention.
In these areas where external checks have broken down or do not exist,
internal checks—the “internal separation of powers”—can act as an effec-
tive, second-best alternative. But again who makes the decision can be piv-
otal. Internal checks are only as strong as the expertise and cultural norms of
the personnel or institutions making decisions. And when the international
and the domestic realms intersect, these norms and expertise can be dis-
persed among decision makers and may not align perfectly with the task at
hand. Therefore, for reasons I touch on briefly here and will explore in future
work, internal separation-of-powers theories must take account of the
unique role of international law and international law experts in internal
decision making. Internal checks may not operate as effectively when inter-
national law arguments are at stake, particularly when international law op-
erates in the domestic sphere to enhance executive power.255 As with the
251. See, e.g., Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaties As Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and the Judicial
Enforcement of Treaties, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 599 (2008) (critiquing the Supreme Court’s approach to trea-
ties in Medellı́n); David Glazier, A Self-Inflicted Wound: A Half-Dozen Years of Turmoil over the Guantánamo
Military Commissions, 12 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 131, 177 (2008) (critiquing the law-of-war basis for
certain crimes contained within the Military Commissions Act of 2006).
252. See Ingber, supra note 109, at 383.
253. See supra notes 202–07 and accompanying text.
254. Id.
255. See supra Part II.B.2.
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external actors discussed in prior sections, the efficacy of internal checks in
this realm relies upon an understanding of and engagement with interna-
tional law. International law engagement is critical for all those charged
with understanding, interpreting, and checking executive power.
Conclusion
The role of international law in our domestic system is significant, and it
is wide-ranging. We should let neither attempts to reject it as irrelevant,
nor fear of its dismissal, stand in the way of nuanced discussion about its
multifaceted nature. This includes recognizing the potential dangers in in-
voking international law to enhance authority or to narrow or override more
restrictive domestic constraints.
This Article proposes potential remedies, in particular a greater burden
on the Executive to demonstrate legitimate reasons for invoking interna-
tional law to enhance its authority as well as clear limitations on that au-
thority. However, real resolution requires renewed engagement with
substantive international law and vigilance by those charged with checking
executive action—the courts, Congress, civil society at large, and even actors
internal to the Executive—to the ways the Executive employs legal interpre-
tation as a tool both to protect and to aggrandize its own authority, at times
at the expense of the separation of powers, individual liberties, and the rule
of law.
